Beyond Scylla and Charybdis: four essays on latent heterogeneity in economic behavior by Bruhin, Adrian
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2008
Beyond Scylla and Charybdis: four essays on latent
heterogeneity in economic behavior
Bruhin, A
Bruhin, A. Beyond Scylla and Charybdis: four essays on latent heterogeneity in economic behavior. 2008,
University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, 2008.
Bruhin, A. Beyond Scylla and Charybdis: four essays on latent heterogeneity in economic behavior. 2008,
University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, 2008.
Beyond Scylla and Charybdis: four essays on latent
heterogeneity in economic behavior
Abstract
Most economic models are limited to analyzing the behavior of a representative agent and,
consequently, make the implicit assumption that either individuals are homogeneous or that individual
heterogeneity does not matter for the aggregate outcome. However, recent empirical evidence in
experimental economics indicates that under strategic complementarity a minority of irrational agents
may, indeed, drive the market's outcome. To avoid potential aggregation bias, researchers in empirical
economics should take individual heterogeneity into account, which results in the following trade-off:
on the one hand, a representative agent approach, which is parsimonious and easy to interpret,
completely neglects heterogeneity, but on the other hand, estimating economic behavior at the
individual level, which requires a lot of parameters and results in a plethora of estimates, may demand
too much from the data. To escape this dilemma, empirical economists may apply finite mixture models,
which offer a compromise between completely ignoring individual heterogeneity and running into
difficulties when estimating individual by individual. This thesis comprises four independent
applications of finite mixture regression models. The first three experimental studies are part of a
comprehensive research project, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, and discuss the
identification and stability of two different behavioral types of decision makers in the domain of risk.
The last essay applies a finite mixture model to the German Socio-Economic Panel to segregate the
share of altruists from the rest of the population which is assumed to be selfish. 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung: Die in der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung gängigen
ökonometrischen Modelle schätzen häufig das Verhalten eines repräsentativen Individuums. Dem liegt
die implizite Annahme zu Grunde, dass sich die Individuen entweder homogen verhalten, oder aber
individuelle Heterogenität keinen Einfluss auf das aggregierte Verhalten ausübt. Neuere empirische und
theoretische Evidenz zeigt jedoch, dass in imperfekten Märkten - insbesondere unter strategischer
Komplementarität - eine Minderheit irrationaler Agenten das Marktgleichgewicht stark beeinflussen
kann. Um Verzerrungen bei der Aggregation zu vermeiden, sollten in solchen Situationen individuelle
Unterschiede zwingend berücksichtigt werden. Typischerweise stehen aber bei Experimentaldaten zu
wenige Beobachtungen pro Individuum zur Verfügung, um komplexe Verhaltensmodelle auf
individueller Ebene schätzen zu können. Finite Mixture Modelle bieten hier einen guten Kompromiss
zwischen einem Repräsentativen Agenten Modell und einer Schätzung auf individueller Ebene: Sie
erlauben es eine bestimmte Anzahl Verhaltenstypen zu identifizieren und jedes einzelne Individuum
endogen einem dieser Verhaltenstypen zuzuordnen. Damit erfassen sie einerseits den entscheidenden
Teil der individuellen Heterogenität, nämlich die Existenz verschiedener Verhaltenstypen, und
benötigen andererseits deutliche weniger Parameter als eine Schätzung auf individueller Ebene.  
Diese Arbeit umfasst vier unabhängige Anwendungen von Finite Mixture Modellen. Die ersten drei
experimentellen Studien sind Teil eines vom Schweizerischen Nationalfonds unterstützten
Forschungsprojekts zur Charakterisierung verschiedener Verhaltenstypen bei Entscheidungen unter
Risiko. In der vierten Studie wird mit einem Finite Mixture Modell der Anteil an Altruisten in einer
Teilstichprobe des Deutschen Haushaltspanels identifiziert.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
1.1 Finite Mixture Models
Most economic models are limited to analyzing the behavior of a representative agent
and, consequently, make the implicit assumption that either individuals are homogeneous
or that individual heterogeneity does not matter for the aggregate outcome. However,
in their seminal papers, Haltiwanger and Waldman assume a mixture of “sophisticated”
and “naive” types and show, that if markets are imperfect and there is strategic comple-
mentarity, i.e. an increase in one agent’s action causes an incentive for the other agents
to increase their actions too, minorities can have a decisive influence on the market’s out-
come (Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985, 1989). Recent empirical evidence in experimental
economics indicates that under strategic complementarity a minority of irrational agents
may, indeed, drive the market’s outcome (Fehr and Tyran, 2005). Thus, to avoid potential
aggregation bias, researchers in empirical economics should take individual heterogeneity
into account, which results in the following trade-off: On the one hand, a representative
agent approach, which is parsimonious and easy to interpret, completely neglects het-
erogeneity, but on the other hand, estimating economic behavior at the individual level,
which requires a lot of parameters and results in a plethora of estimates, may demand
too much from the data. To escape this dilemma, empirical economists may apply fi-
nite mixture models, which offer a compromise between completely ignoring individual
heterogeneity and running into difficulties when estimating individual by individual.
In contrast to common formulations in econometrics, finite mixture models relax the
assumption of homogeneity and assume the population as being made up of a finite num-
ber of C different groups. Each of these groups has its own data generating process with
component density gc (X ; θc), where X represents the data and θc denotes a group-specific
vector of parameters. The component densities can principally be chosen among all valid
density functions and need not necessarily belong to the same distributional family. This
renders finite mixture models an extremely flexible tool, either for fitting heterogeneous
data sets with several distinctly different types or, from a more data-oriented perspec-
tive, for semi-parametrically approximating any complex empirical density by a mix of
Gaussian components (Priebe, 1994).
As noted by McLachlan and Peel (2000), the history of finite mixture models dates
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back over a century to Pearson (1894) who fitted a mixture of two normally distributed
components to identify two subpopulations of crabs differing in their average size. How-
ever, in spite of their potential flexibility, their complex structure prevented finite mixture
models from becoming popular in applied empirical research for over 80 years. Not un-
til the advent of the EM algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977), combined with the rapidly
declining price of computing power, have applications of finite mixture models surged in
various fields, such as biology, medicine, computer and social science. In political science,
for example, McCutcheon (1987), contributed an early survey of latent class analysis, an
application of finite mixture modelling to contingency tables.
In econometrics, Heckman and Singer (1984) aimed at consistently estimating struc-
tural parameters in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast to classical
random coefficient models, which rely on distributional assumptions, their approach uses
a finite mixture model for semi-parametrically approximating the (continuous) distribu-
tion of unobservables and, therefore, does not intend to classify individuals according
to afinite number of C distinct types. In his seminal paper, however, Hamilton (1989)
introduced finite mixture models to time series analysis where they are usually referred
to as regime switching models and used to identify “[...] occasional, discrete shifts” in
the analyzed series, an approach which comes close to the idea of characterizing different
groups.
The concept of applying finite mixture regression models to identify distinctly different
behavioral types and to classify each individual stochastically as one of these types, which
is central to all four applications in this thesis, has emerged every now and then in
experimental economics since the nineties of the past century (see Stahl and Wilson
(1995), El-Gamal and Grether (1995), and Houser et al. (2004) for example). As they
allow controlling for different behavioral types while being relatively parsimonious, finite
mixture models offer a compromise in the mentioned trade-off between staying completely
agnostic about individual heterogeneity by estimating a representative agent’s behavior
and demanding too much from the data by running the estimation at the individual level.
In the context of endogenously classifying individuals to a finite number of distinctly
different behavioral types, finite mixture regression models have proven to be valuable
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tools to control for unobserved heterogeneity in experimental data sets and, recently,
have even been applied in a similar manner for analyzing survey data (Clark et al., 2005).
1.1.1 General Structure
The characteristic structure of a finite mixture model arises quite naturally: As it is
a priori unknown which individual i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is associated with which group, the
researcher faces latent heterogeneity and has to write the individual contribution to the
finite mixture model’s density as the sum of the component densities gc (Xi; θc) weighted
by the probabilities pic that individual i belongs to group c:
f (Xi; θ) =
C∑
c=1
pic gc (Xi; θc) . (1.1)
These probabilities pic, which have to sum up to one, represent C−1 additional parameters
of the model and are equal to the respective groups’ relative sizes, since all observations
are drawn with the same probability.
To fit his model, Pearson (1894) applied the method of moments which involved the
tremendous computational effort of finding the roots of a ninth-degree polynomial. How-
ever, their complex likelihood function, the cost for their flexibility, prevented finite mix-
ture models from becoming popular in applied empirical research even after the advent
of the more efficient method of maximum likelihood and inexpensive personal computers.
Indeed, it is widely known that even after taking logs, a finite mixture model’s likelihood
function
lnL (Ψ;X ) =
N∑
i=1
ln
C∑
c=1
pic gc (Xi; θc) , (1.2)
where Ψ = (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
C , pi1, . . . ,piC−1)
′, is highly non-linear, potentially multimodal and can
even be unbounded, which makes it very hard to be estimated by standard optimization
routines implemented in today’s statistical software packages.
1.1.2 Estimation
Things have changed with the development of the Expectation Maximization (EM) algo-
rithm by Dempster et al. (1977) who focus on the issue of latent heterogeneity and view
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X as an incomplete data set. They note that if the data were complete, i.e. individual
group membership were observed and indicated by tic ∈ {0, 1}, the individual density
would be given by
f˜ (Xi, ti; θ) =
C∏
c=1
[pic gc (Xi; θc)]tic . (1.3)
Since equation (1.3) would involve a product over all components, and not a sum such as
equation (1.1) does, the complete-data log likelihood function would simplify to
ln L˜ (Ψ;X , t) =
N∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
tic [ln pic + ln gc (Xi; θc)] , (1.4)
where the maximum likelihood estimates of the relative group sizes, pˆic = 1/N
∑N
i=1 tic,
would be given analytically and could be obtained separately from the estimates of the
group-specific parameters, θˆc. The EM algorithm operates on the complete-data log
likelihood by proceeding iteratively in two steps, E and M. During the E-step of the
(k + 1)-th iteration the a posteriori probabilities of individual group membership are
computed according to Bayes’ law given the actual fit to the data, Ψ(k):
τ (k+1)ic
(X ;Ψ(k)) = pi(k)c gc
(
Xi; θ(k)c
)
∑C
m=1 pi
(k)
m gm
(
Xi; θ(k)m
) . (1.5)
In the following M-step, with these τ (k+1)ic
(X ;Ψ(k)) replacing the unobserved indicators
of individual group membership, tic, the complete-data log likelihood (1.4) is maximized,
providing an update of the parameter vector Ψ(k+1). Note that these a posteriori prob-
abilities of individual group membership are not only used in the M-step, but they also
provide a tool for assigning each individual in the sample to one of the C groups. Thus,
finite mixture models may serve as statistically well grounded tools for endogenous indi-
vidual classification. Dempster et al. (1977) showed that the likelihood never decreases
from one iteration to the next and that the EM algorithm, as any hill climbing algorithm,
converges monotonically to the maximum which is closest to its initial values, Ψ(0).
So, even if the EM algorithm helps coping with the characteristic non-linearity of a
finite mixture model’s likelihood it may still be plagued by its potential multimodality. To
overcome such a tendency of converging towards local maxima in complex finite mixture
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models, Celeux et al. (1996) suggest using stochastic extensions of the EM algorithm. In
each iteration, these stochastic versions of the EM algorithm all have a non-zero probabil-
ity of leaving a once taken path to convergence and continuing in a different region of the
likelihood function. Such a procedure results in an improved robustness to the objective
function’s potential multimodality but comes at the cost of even higher computational
demands. However, a hybrid algorithm, as suggested by Render and Walker (1984) in
their treatise on maximum likelihood estimation of mixture densities, which first uses an
EM type algorithm to deal with the likelihood’s nastiness before it switches to the much
faster standard BFGS algorithm (Broyden, 1970), performs reasonably well in all four
applications discussed in this thesis.
1.1.3 Identification
Furthermore, some specific identification problems which may arise during the estimation
of a finite mixture model should be briefly mentioned at this point. A more formal and
extensive discussion of the identification issues in finite mixture models may be found in
Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2006). First, as equation (1.1) shows, any finite mixture model’s
density is obviously only identified up to an arbitrary permutation in the C different
groups’ labeling, i.e. the likelihood is the same when the groups’ labels are interchanged.
As long as the researcher is exclusively interested in the maximum likelihood estimates,
this is of minor relevance. But as soon as she wants to use standard errors obtained
by the bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) or estimate the model from a
Bayesian point of view by applying MCMC simulation techniques, the groups’ labels
will spontaneously change from one draw to the other and, consequently, so called label
switching becomes a problem. Normally, label switching can be effectively prevented
by imposing some straightforward identification restriction on the groups’ labels such as
pi1 < pi2 < . . . < piC , for example. Second, even after avoiding label switching, a finite
mixture model with fully identified component densities and a data matrix, X , which has
full rank, may still be unidentified. As Gru¨n and Leisch (2004) point out, in such a case
lack of identification occurs when, intuitively speaking, the variables in X take on too
few different realizations relative to the number of groups, C. Panel (a) in Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.1: Identification of Finite Mixture Models
(a): Lack of Identification
x
y
x1 x2
(b): Identification through Additional Realizations
x
y
x1 x3 x2
(c): Identification through Panel Structure
x
y
x1 x2
*++
*
*+
+
*
*
+*
Following Gru¨n and Leisch (2004).
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illustrates such a situation for the simple example of a linear regression of an outcome, y,
on a binary independent variable, x, with the two possible realizations x1 and x2. In this
case, regardless of sample size, the data never contains sufficient information to identify a
finite mixture specification with C = 2 components, i.e. the solution with the two straight
regression lines is equally likely as the solution with the two dashed ones. But if x can
take on a third value, x3, the model is identified as shown in Panel (b). In panel data
sets with several observations per individual, however, the model can also be identified
by choosing individuals rather than observations as unit of classification. Thus, the often
natural assumption that all observations of one individual must belong to the same group
imposes additional structure on the model and ensures its identifiability. In Figure 1.1,
this is depicted in the bottom Panel (c) where all data points from one individual are
represented by the same symbol in the scatter plot. In practice, identification through
the data’s panel structure often turns out to be crucial for reliably fitting complex finite
mixture regression models, even when they may be theoretically identified without such
an additional structure.
Moreover, if the researcher wants to use a finite mixture model for classification pur-
poses and has no theoretical a priori knowledge about the optimal number of behavioral
types in the population, the question of how to choose C optimally turns out to be very
difficult and remains, at least to some extent, still open (Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, 2006). It
is well known that classical information criteria, such as the Akaike or Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion, tend to overestimate the number of groups and lead to a specification
which overfits the data (Celeux and Soromenho, 1996). However, there are three different
approaches which may provide an indication about the optimal number of classes: apply-
ing simulated likelihood ratio tests, approximating the model’s marginal likelihood in a
Bayesian framework (Houser et al., 2004), or minimizing a normalized entropy criterion
(El-Gamal and Grether, 1995; Celeux and Soromenho, 1996). Besides relying on theo-
retical arguments about the number of behavioral types, the four applications presented
in this thesis follow the latter approach and apply El-Gamal’s Average Normalized En-
tropy, ANE, which is not only relatively inexpensive to compute but has also an intuitive
interpretation.
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1.2 Structure of This Thesis
This thesis comprises four independent applications of finite mixture regression models.
The first three experimental studies are part of a comprehensive research project, funded
by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), and discuss the identification and
stability of two different behavioral types of decision makers in the domain of risk. The
last essay applies a finite mixture model to the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
to segregate the share of altruists from the rest of the population which is assumed to be
selfish.
Chapter 2 discusses the first contribution to the SNSF project. The past decades of
experimental economic research have demonstrated that there is considerable heterogene-
ity in individual risk taking behavior, but little is known about the distribution of risk
taking types. Together with my coauthors, Helga Fehr and Thomas Epper, I present a
parsimonious characterization of risk taking behavior by estimating a finite mixture re-
gression model for three different experimental data sets, two Swiss and one Chinese. In
all three data sets participants’ certainty equivalents are elicited for a large number of
binary lotteries over real gains and losses. We find a robust segregation into two distinct
behavioral types: In all three data sets, the choices of roughly 80 percent of the subjects
exhibit significant deviations from rational probability weighting, consistent with a rank-
and sign-dependent decision model such as proposed by prospect theory. 20 percent of the
subjects, however, do not distort probabilities and behave essentially as expected value
maximizers. Furthermore, the model cleanly segregates the individuals into these two
groups and achieves a low entropy measure. Thus, to avoid aggregation bias in situations
with strategic complementarity, researchers in applied economic modeling may consider
using a mix of preference theories rather than assuming a representative decision maker.
In Chapter 3 we investigate how risk tolerance varies with stake size in the Chinese
data set. On the one hand, this question is generally interesting for assesssing the external
validity of experimental studies, which typically involve substantially lower stakes than
do important risky decisions in real life. On the other hand, as the actual composition
of the population may be decisive for market outcomes, it is important to know whether
the segregation into two distinct behavioral types, as discussed in Chapter 2, remains
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stable when the lotteries’ stakes are increased considerably. On the aggregate level, an
increase in stakes from about an hourly wage to roughly a monthly income causes the
individuals to behave relatively more risk averse for gains but not for losses, for which risk
aversion remains essentially stable. When we control for latent individual heterogeneity by
estimating the finite mixture regression model, the separation in one fifth expected utility
theory types and four fifths prospect theory types turns out to be robust to increasing
stakes. Moreover, the expected utility theory types still behave risk neutrally, whereas
the other group’s higher average degree of risk aversion is largely due to a shift in their
probability weights. Since probability weights should, in theory, not be affected by stake
size, this result for the majority group questions prospect theory as a proper descriptive
model.
Chapter 4 therefore assesses the performance of prospect theory versus stochastic util-
ity theory, a recent model for individual decision making under risk, which extends ex-
pected utility theory and assumes that individuals are prone to make random errors when
computing a lottery’s expected utility (Blavatskyy, 2007). For aggregate data the results
are mixed: Notwithstanding its parsimony, stochastic expected utility theory clearly out-
performs prospect theory in the Zurich data. In China, however, prospect theory seems to
have a slight edge over the model based on stochastic expected utility theory. Neverthe-
less, if I take latent heterogeneity into account and estimate a finite mixture specification
of the two theories, a consistent picture emerges. With a few exceptions, the individuals
are segregated into the same two behavioral types as in Chapter 2. The risk neutral
group’s behavior is represented by stochastic expected utility theory, whereas the rest of
the population, still, is best described by prospect theory. Hence, even if stochastic ex-
pected utility theory is an elegant and parsimonious approach, which generally describes
aggregate choices well, it seems to fall short of prospect theory’s descriptive power when
individual heterogeneity is taken into account.
The final Chapter 5 extends the finite mixture approach to survey data. Even though
several results from experimental economics suggest that the population is made up of
different social preference types (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002),
there exists barely any survey-based evidence on individuals exhibiting heterogeneous
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social preferences. In this study, Rainer Winkelmann and I investigate the prevalence
and extent of altruism by examining the relationship between parents’ and their adult
children’s subjective well-being in a sample extracted from the GSOEP. To segregate the
share of parents with altruistic preferences from those who are assumed to be strictly
selfish, we estimate a finite mixture extension of the ordered probit model. Furthermore,
we apply a family-effects estimator to avoid biased estimators due to various potential
sources of endogeneity. The estimate of the altruist’s share among the population amounts
to roughly 20 percent. Not only does this fraction of altruists coincide with a recent survey-
based psychological study, but also the parents who get identified as altruists indeed make
higher average transfer payments to their children.
11
Bibliography
Andreoni, J. and J. Miller (2002): “Giving According to GARP: An Experimental
Test of The Rationality of Altruism,” Econometrica, 70, 737–753.
Blavatskyy, P. R. (2007): “Stochastic Expected Utility Theory,” Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 34, 259–286.
Broyden, C. (1970): “The Convergence of a Class of Double-Rank Minimization Algo-
rithms,” Journal of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications, 6, 76–90.
Celeux, G., D. Chauveau, and J. Diebolt (1996): “Stochastic Versions of the
EM Algorithm: An Experimental Study in the Mixture Case,” Journal of Statistical
Computation and Simulation, 55, 287–314.
Celeux, G. and G. Soromenho (1996): “An Entropy Criterion for Assessing the
Number of Clusters in a Mixture Model,” Journal of Classification, 13, 195–212.
Charness, G. and M. Rabin (2002): “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple
Tests,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817–868.
Clark, A., F. Etile, F. Postel-Vinay, C. Senik, and K. V. der Straeten
(2005): “Heterogeneity in ReportedWell-Being: Evidence from Twelve European Coun-
tries,” The Economic Journal, 115, C118–C132.
Dempster, A., N. Laird, and D. Rubin (1977): “Maximum Likelihood from Incom-
plete Data via the EM Algorithm,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B,
39, 1–38.
Efron, B. and R. J. Tibshirani (1993): An Introduction to the Bootstrap, Chapman
and Hall/CRC.
El-Gamal, M. A. and D. M. Grether (1995): “Are People Bayesian? Uncovering
Behavioral Strategies,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90, 1137–1145.
Fehr, E. and J. R. Tyran (2005): “Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 43–66.
12
Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, S. (2006): Finite Mixture and Markov Switching Models,
Springer.
Gru¨n, B. and F. Leisch (2004): “Bootstrapping Finite Mixture Models,” in Compstat
2004 — Proceedings in Computational Statistics, Physica Verlag, Heidelberg, 1115–
1122.
Haltiwanger, J. C. and M. Waldman (1985): “Rational Expectations and the Limits
of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity,” American Economic Review, 75, 326–
340.
——— (1989): “Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The Implications for
Macroeconomics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 463–483.
Hamilton, J. D. (1989): “A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary
Time Series and the Business Cycle,” Econometrica, 57, 357–384.
Heckman, J. and B. Singer (1984): “A Method for Minimizing the Impact of Distri-
butional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data,” Econometrica, 52,
271–3220.
Houser, D., M. Keane, and K. McCabe (2004): “Behavior in a Dynamic Decision
Problem: An Analysis of Experimental Evidence using a Bayesian Type Classification
Algorithm,” Econometrica, 72, 781–822.
McCutcheon, A. L. (1987): Latent Class Analysis, Sage Publications.
McLachlan, G. and D. Peel (2000): Finite Mixture Models, Wiley Series in Proba-
bilities and Statistics.
Pearson, K. (1894): “Contributions to the Theory of Mathematical Evolution,” Philo-
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 185, 71–110.
Priebe, C. (1994): “Adaptive Mixtures,” Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, 89, 796–806.
13
Render, R. A. and X. Walker (1984): “Mixture Densities, Maximum Likelihood and
the EM Algorithm,” SIAM Review, 26, 195–239.
Stahl, D. O. and P. W. Wilson (1995): “On Players’ Models of other Players: Theory
and Experimental Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 218–254.
14
Chapter 2
Risk and Rationality:
Uncovering Heterogeneity in
Probability Distortion
This chapter is joint work with Helga Fehr and Thomas Epper.
Another version of this chapter has been published as SOI Working Paper 0705 and is
currently under review at Econometrica.
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2.1 Introduction
Risk is a ubiquitous feature of social and economic life. Many of our everyday choices, and
often the most important ones, such as what trade to learn and where to live, involve risky
consequences. While it has long been recognized that individuals differ in their risk taking
attitudes, surprisingly little is known about the distribution of risk preferences in the
population (for an exception see Dohmen et al. (2005)). Since preferences are one of the
ultimate drivers of behavior, knowledge of the composition of risk attitudes is paramount
to predicting economic behavior. Economic models often allow for heterogeneity, but this
heterogeneity is usually confined to remain within the boundaries of the standard model of
preferences, expected utility theory (EUT). The empirical evidence, however, reveals that
heterogeneity in risk taking behavior is of a substantive kind, i.e. some people evaluate
risky prospects consistently with EUT, whereas other people depart substantially from
expected utility maximization (Hey and Orme, 1994). Moreover, it seems to be the case
that rational decision makers revealing EUT-preferences constitute only a minority of the
population. To improve descriptive performance a plethora of alternative theories have
been developed. Unfortunately, no single best fitting model has been identified so far
(Harless and Camerer, 1994; Starmer, 2000) and, depending on the individual, one or the
other model fits better. This finding poses a serious problem for applied economics. What
the modeler needs is a parsimonious representation of risk preferences that is empirically
well grounded and robust, and not a host of different functionals. Providing such a
parsimonious characterization of heterogeneity in risk taking behavior is the objective of
this paper.
Our method is based on a literature on classifying individuals which has recently
emerged in the social sciences. On the basis of statistical classification procedures, such
as finite mixture regression models, investigators have tried to discover which decision
rules people actually use when playing games or dealing with complex decision situations
(El-Gamal and Grether, 1995; Houser et al., 2004; Houser and Winter, 2004). The finite
mixture regression approach does not require fitting a model for each individual, which
is - given the usual quality of choice data - frequently impossible. Instead, our approach
reveals latent heterogeneity by estimating the fractions of distinct behavioral types and
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by endogenously assigning each individual to one specific type, characterized by a unique
set of parameter values.
We apply such a finite mixture regression model to choice data from three different
experiments, two of which were conducted in Zurich, Switzerland. The third experiment
took place in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. We analyze 452 subjects’ decisions over
real monetary gains and losses, which comprise a total of about 18,000 choices. All three
experiments were designed in a similar manner and served to elicit certainty equivalents
for binary lotteries. Using a flexible sign-dependent functional as basic behavioral model,
we show the following results.
First, the estimation procedure renders a robust classification of risk taking behavior
across all three data sets. Irrespective of time and place of the experiments, two distinct
behavioral types of individuals are identified. Moreover, the proportions of these distinct
types in their respective populations are practically equal in both the Swiss and the
Chinese data sets and amount to roughly 20:80.
Second, almost all the experimental subjects are unambiguously assigned to one of
the two distinct types. Measuring the quality of classification by the Average Normalized
Entropy (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995), ambiguity of assignments amounts to less than
5% of maximum entropy, a value which is, to our knowledge, unequaled in the literature.
Thus, we observe hardly any “ambiguous” types, i.e. individuals with a high probability
(of say 0.4) of being one type and a high probability (of say 0.6) of being the other type
are practically absent. This clean segregation suggests that the classification procedure
is able to capture the distinctive characteristics of each behavioral type.
Third, without restricting parameter values a priori, we find that, in all three data
sets, the minority types weight probabilities and evaluate value monetary outcomes nearly
linearly. Consequently, this group of individuals can essentially be characterized as ex-
pected value maximizers. This result is particularly interesting in the light of Rabin’s
calibration theorem (Rabin, 2000), which shows that expected utility maximizers should
be approximately risk neutral for small stakes typically encountered in laboratory exper-
iments. Therefore, we label subjects belonging to this group of nearly risk neutral people
as “EUT types”.
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Fourth, the majority of individuals, labeled as “CPT types”, are characterized by
significant deviations from linear probability weighting, consistent with prospect theory.
For all three prospect theory groups we obtain similar parameter values for the probability
weighting functions and the value functions over losses, indicating considerable temporal
and cross-cultural stability of preference parameters. For decisions over gains, however,
Chinese behavior differs substantially from Swiss behavior. Overweighting of probabilities
is more pronounced and the sensitivity to changes in probabilities is substantially lower
for Chinese subjects, rendering the Chinese relatively more risk seeking for gains over a
considerable range of probabilities. Thus, the finite mixture regression helps to better
understand the nature of cross-cultural differences.
These results show that the classification procedure successfully uncovers latent het-
erogeneity in the population. If there is heterogeneity of a substantive kind, as the data
suggest, basing predictions on a single preference theory is inappropriate and may lead
to biased results. EUT preferences should be taken account of alongside prospect theory
preferences, even if rational behavior constitutes only a minority in the population. As
the literature on the role of bounded rationality under strategic complementarity and sub-
stitutability has shown (Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985, 1989; Fehr and Tyran, 2005;
Camerer and Fehr, 2006), the mix of rational and irrational actors may be decisive for
aggregate outcomes. Depending on the nature of the strategic interdependence the be-
havior of even a minority of players may drive the aggregate outcome. Therefore, the mix
of types in the population is a crucial variable in predicting market outcomes. Since the
finite mixture regression provides a robust and reliable classification of individuals, the
resulting estimates of group sizes and group-specific parameters may serve as valuable
inputs for applied economics.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous study showing a nearly identical
classification of risk preference types for three independent data sets. Related work by
Harrison and colleagues (Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2005; Harrison et al., 2005; Andersen
et al., 2006) also applies finite mixture regressions to several experimental data sets, but
decisively distinguishes itself from our analysis. Their estimation procedure sorts choices,
irrespective by whom they were taken, by decision model, while we aim at classifying
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individuals by behavioral type. Since different types of individuals may behave the same
way in certain decision situations, namely when probability weighting does not play much
of a role, a classification of choices cannot reliably identify different individual types
of risk taking behavior. Therefore, distinguishing EUT-consistent choices from CPT-
consistent ones in these specific decision situations is nearly impossible. As a consequence,
a classification of choices is bound to be highly ambiguous, even though there are clearly
distinct types of decision makers. This may be one reason why Harrison and colleagues
find a rather ambiguous classification of choices, while we unambiguously identify two
distinct types of decision makers.
Moreover, a classification of choices depends on the mix of lotteries. If subjects face
a large proportion of lotteries with gain probabilities in the vicinity of 0.4, the weight
of EUT tends to be relatively high because of the ambiguity of classification for these
lotteries. This dependence on the mix of lotteries renders a classification of choices rather
arbitrary.
In addition, Harrison and colleagues restrict one decision model to be consistent with
expected utility theory, whereas our estimation procedure assigns subjects to one of two
endogenously defined types, one of which turns out to be essentially consistent with EUT-
preferences. Thus, our results can be viewed as much stronger evidence in favor of EUT.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the experimental design and
procedures of the three experiments. The functional specification of the behavioral model
and the finite mixture regression model are discussed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents
descriptive statistics of the data and the results of the classification procedure. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
In the following section we describe the experimental setup and procedures. The exper-
iments took place in Zurich in 2003 and 2006 as well as in Beijing in 2005. In Zurich,
all subjects were recruited from the subject pool of the Institute for Empirical Research
in Economics, which consists of students of all fields of the University of Zurich and the
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Table 2.1: Differences in Experimental Design
Zurich 03 Zurich 06 Beijing 05
Number of:
Subjects 181 118 153
Lotteries 50 40 28
Observations 9,005 4,669 4,281
Procedure computerized computerized paper and pencil
Framing abstract and contextual abstract and
contextual contextual
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. In Beijing, subjects were recruited by flier
distributed at the campus of Peking University and Tsinhua University. Since all three
experiments are based on the same design principles, we will present the prototype ex-
periment Zurich 2003 in detail (Fehr-Duda et al., 2006) and describe to what extent the
other two experiments deviate from the prototype. The main distinguishing features of
the different experiments are summarized in Table 2.1.
We elicited certainty equivalents for a large number of two-outcome lotteries. One half
of the lotteries were framed as choices between risky and certain gains (“gain domain”), the
other half were presented as choices between risky and certain losses (“loss domain”). For
each decision in the loss domain, subjects were endowed with a specific monetary amount,
which served to cover potential losses and equalized expected payoffs of corresponding gain
and loss lotteries. In the Zurich 2003 and the Beijing experiments, 50% of the subjects
were confronted with decisions framed in the standard gamble format. The other 50% of
the subjects had to make choices framed in contextual terms, i.e. gains were represented as
risky or sure investment gains, losses as repair costs and insurance premiums, respectively.
The Zurich 2006 experiment was based on contextually framed lotteries only. In Zurich,
outcomes x1 and x2 ranged from zero Swiss Francs to 150 Swiss Francs1. The payoffs in the
Beijing 2005 experiment were commensurate with the compensation in Zurich and varied
between 4 and 55 Chinese Yuan. Expected payoffs per subject amounted to approximately
31 Swiss Francs and 20 Chinese Yuan, respectively, which was considerably more than a
local student assistant’s hourly compensation, plus a show up fee of 10 Swiss Francs and
1At the time of the experiment one Swiss Franc equalled about 0.90 U.S. Dollars.
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Table 2.2: Gain Lotteries Zurich 03 (x1, p;x2)
p x1 x2 p x1 x2 p x1 x2
0.05 20 0 0.25 50 20 0.75 50 20
0.05 40 10 0.50 10 0 0.90 10 0
0.05 50 20 0.50 20 10 0.90 20 10
0.05 150 50 0.50 40 10 0.90 50 0
0.10 10 0 0.50 50 0 0.95 20 0
0.10 20 10 0.50 50 20 0.95 40 10
0.10 50 0 0.50 150 0 0.95 50 20
0.25 20 0 0.75 20 0
0.25 40 10 0.75 40 10
Outcomes x1 and x2 are denominated in Swiss Francs (CHF).
20 Chinese Yuan, thus generating salient incentives. Probabilities p of the lotteries’ higher
gain or loss x1 varied from 5% to 95%. The gain lotteries for Zurich 2003 are presented in
Table 2.2. The other two experiments essentially included a subset of these. The lotteries
appeared in random order on a computer screen2, in Beijing on paper.
In the computerized experiments, the screen displayed a decision sheet containing
the specifics of the lottery under consideration and a list of 20 equally spaced certain
outcomes, ranging from the lottery’s maximum payoff to the lottery’s minimum payoff, as
shown in Figure 2.13. The subjects had to indicate whether they preferred the lottery or
the certain payoff for each row of the decision sheet. The lottery’s certainty equivalent was
calculated as the arithmetic mean of the smallest certain amount the subject preferred to
the lottery and the following certain amount on the list, when the subject had, for the
first time, reported preference for the lottery. For example, if the subject had decided
as indicated by the small circles in Figure 2.1, her certainty equivalent would amount to
13.5 Swiss Francs.
Before subjects were permitted to start working on the experimental decisions, they
had to correctly calculate the payoffs for two hypothetical choices. In the computerized
experiments, there were two trial rounds to familiarize the subjects with the procedure.
At the end of the experiment, one row number of one decision sheet was randomly selected
for each subject, and the subject’s choice in that row determined her payment. Subjects
2The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
3The format of the decision sheet for the Beijing experiment was identical to the Zurich one.
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Figure 2.1: Design of the Decision Sheet
Decision situation:
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Guaranteed payoff amounting to:
1 A o B
2 A o B
3 A o B
4 A o B
5 A o B
6 A o B
7 A o B
8 A o B
9 A o B
10 A o B
11 A o B
12 A o B
13 A o B
14 A o B
15 A o B
16 A o B
17 A o B
18 A o B
19 A o B
20 A o B 1
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13
12
OK
20
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Option B
7
6
5
4
3
2
Option A Your Choice:
A profit of CHF 20 with 
probability 75%             
and a profit of CHF 0 with 
probability 25% 
11
10
9
8
18
17
16
28
were paid in private afterward. The subjects could work at their own speed, the vast
majority of them needed less than an hour to complete the experiment.
2.3 Econometric Model
This section discusses the specification of the finite mixture regression model, which al-
lows controlling for latent heterogeneity in risk taking behavior in a parsimonious way.
Estimating the finite mixture model yields the relative sizes of a pre-specified number of
groups and the group-specific parameters of the underlying behavioral model. Moreover,
as we use the Expectation Maximization algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977) to compute
the maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters, we obtain Bayesian updates
for the probabilities of individual group membership. This procedure allows us to assign
each individual to a specific group.
For the purpose of classifying subjects according to risk taking type, we need to spec-
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ify three ingredients of the mixture model: the basic theory of decision under risk, the
functional form of the decision model, and the specification of the error term.
The underlying theory of decision under risk should be able to accommodate a wide
range of different behaviors. Sign- and rank-dependent models, such as cumulative
prospect theory (CPT), capture two robust empirical phenomena: nonlinear probabil-
ity weighting and loss aversion (Starmer, 2000). Therefore, a flexible approach, such as
proposed by CPT, lends itself to describing risk taking behavior. Moreover, CPT nests
EUT as special case. If there is a group of people, whose behavior can best be described
by EUT, these individuals should be identified by the finite mixture regression as a unique
group exhibiting the predicted behavior.
Suppose that there are C different types of individuals in the population. According
to CPT, an individual belonging to a certain group c ∈ {1, . . . , C} values any binary
gamble Gg = (x1g, pg;x2g), g ∈ {1, . . . , G}, where |x1g| > |x2g|, by
v (Gg) = v(x1g)w(pg) + v(x2g)(1− w(pg)). (2.1)
The function v(x) describes how monetary outcomes x are valued, whereas the function
w(p) assigns a subjective weight to every outcome probability p. The gamble’s certainty
equivalent cˆeg can then be written as
cˆeg = v
−1 [v(x1g)w(pg) + v(x2g)(1− w(pg))] . (2.2)
In order to make CPT operational, we have to assume specific functional forms for
the value function v(x) and the probability weighting function w(p). A natural candidate
for v(x) is a sign-dependent power functional
v(x) =
 xα if x ≥ 0−(−x)β otherwise, (2.3)
which can be conveniently interpreted and has turned out to be the best compromise
between parsimony and goodness of fit in the context of prospect theory (Stott, 2006). For
this specification of the value function, the existence of loss aversion can be inferred from
the difference in the domain-specific curvatures. According to Tversky and Kahneman,
loss aversion, in the sense that “losses loom larger than corresponding gains”, is present
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if v′(x) < v′(−x) for x ≥ 0 (Tversky and Kahneman (1992), p.303). This is the case if
the estimated β is significantly larger than α.
A variety of functional forms for modeling probability weights w(p) have been proposed
in the literature (Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Prelec, 1998). We use the
two-parameter specification suggested by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and Lattimore
et al. (1992):
w(p) =
δpγ
δpγ + (1− p)γ , δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0. (2.4)
We favor this specification because it has proven to account well for individual hetero-
geneity (Wu et al., 2004) and the parameters are nicely interpretable. The parameter γ
largely governs the slope of the curve, whereas the parameter δ largely governs its ele-
vation. The smaller the value of γ, the more strongly the probability weighting function
departs from linear weighting. The larger the value of δ, the more elevated is the curve,
ceteris paribus. Linear weighting is characterized by γ = δ = 1. In a sign-dependent
model, the parameters may take on different values for gains and for losses.
We now turn to the third step of model specification. In the course of the experiments,
we measured risk taking behavior of individual i ∈ {1, . . . , N} by her certainty equivalents
ceig for a set of different lotteries. Since CPT explains deterministic choice, we have to
add an error term (ig in order to estimate the parameters of the model based on the
elicited certainty equivalents. The observed certainty equivalent ceig can then be written
as ceig = cˆeg + (ig. There may be different sources of error, such as carelessness, hurry
or inattentiveness, resulting in accidentally wrong answers (Hey and Orme, 1994). The
Central Limit Theorem supports the assumption that the errors are normally distributed
and simply add white noise.
Furthermore, we allow for three different sources of heteroskedasticity in the error
variance. First, for each lottery the subjects have to consider 20 certain outcomes, which
are equally spaced throughout the lottery’s range |x1g−x2g|. Since the observed certainty
equivalent ceig is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the smallest certain amount pre-
ferred to the lottery and the following certain amount, where the lottery is preferred, the
error is proportional to the lottery range. Second, as the subjects may be heterogeneous
with respect to their previous knowledge, their ability of finding the correct certainty
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equivalent as well as their attention span, we expect the error variance to differ by indi-
vidual. Third, lotteries in the gain domain may be evaluated differently from the ones in
the loss domain. Therefore, we allow for domain-specific variance in the error term. This
yields the form σig = ξi|x1g−x2g| for the standard deviation of the error term distribution,
where ξi denotes an individual domain-specific parameter. Note that the model allows to
test for both individual-specific and domain-specific heteroskedasticity by either imposing
the restriction ξi = ξ, or by forcing all the ξi to be equal in both decision domains. Both
restrictions are rejected by their corresponding likelihood ratio tests in all three samples
with p-values close to zero. Therefore, we control for all three types of heteroskedasticity
in the estimation procedure.
Having discussed all the necessary ingredients, we now turn to the specification of
the finite mixture regression model. The basic idea of the mixture model is assigning an
individual’s risk-taking choices to one of C different types of behavior, each characterized
by a distinct vector of parameters θc = (αc, βc, γ′c, δ
′
c)
′4. We denote the proportions of
these different types in the population by pic. Given our assumptions on the distribution
of the error term, the density of type c for the i-th individual can be expressed as
f (cei,G; θc, ξi) =
G∏
g=1
1
σig
φ
(
ceig − cˆeg
σig
)
, (2.5)
where φ(·) denotes the density of the standard normal distribution. Since we do not
know a priori to which group a certain individual belongs to, the proportions pic are
interpreted as probabilities of group membership. Therefore, each individual density of
type c has to be weighted by its respective mixing proportion pic, which, of course, is
unknown and has to be estimated as well. Summing over all C components yields the
individual’s contribution to the model’s likelihood L. The log likelihood of the finite
mixture regression model is then given by
lnL (Ψ; ce,G) =
N∑
i=1
ln
C∑
c=1
pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi), (2.6)
where the vector Ψ = (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
C , pi1, . . . ,piC−1, ξ1, . . . , ξN)
′ summarizes all the parameters
of the model which need to be estimated.
4The vectors γc and δc contain the domain-specific parameters for the slope and the elevation of the
probability weighting functions.
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The parameters are estimated by the iterative Expectation Maximization (EM) algo-
rithm, which provides an additional feature: In each iteration, the algorithm calculates
by Bayesian updating an individual’s posterior probability τic of belonging to group c.
The posterior probabilities τic represent a particularly valuable result of the estimation
procedure. Not only do we obtain the probabilities of individual group membership, but
we also have a method of judging the quality of the classification at our disposal. If all
the τic are either close to zero or one, all the individuals are unambiguously assigned to
one specific group. The τic can be used to calculate a summary measure of ambiguity,
such as the Average Normalized Entropy (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995), in order to gage
the extent of dubious assignments. If classification has been successful, i.e. if genuinely
distinct types have been identified, we should observe a low measure of entropy.
The resulting τic also provide a basis for discriminating between models with differing
numbers of types. Since the finite mixture regression model is defined over a pre-specified
number of groups, the researcher needs a criterion for assessing the correct number of
groups. In the context of mixture models, classical criteria, such as the Akaike Information
Criterion AIC or the Bayesian Information Criterion BIC, are not suited for this purpose
(Celeux and Soromenho, 1996). Celeux proposes to use entropy criteria based on the
posterior probabilities of group assignment τic instead, which are shown to perform better
than the classical criteria.
Various problems may be encountered when maximizing the likelihood function of a
finite mixture regression model and, therefore, a customized estimation procedure has
to be used, which can adequately deal with these problems. Details of the estimation
procedure, written in the R environment (R Development Core Team, 2006), are discussed
in the Appendix.
2.4 Results
In the following section we present the results of the finite mixture regressions after
describing observed risk taking behavior. First, we discuss the distributions of distinct
risk taking types emerging in each of the three data sets and document the cleanness
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Figure 2.2: Median Relative Risk Premia Zurich 2003
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and robustness of individuals’ segregation to types. Furthermore, each distinct type of
individuals is characterized by the estimated behavioral parameter values, whereby we
also address the issue of cross-cultural differences. Finally, we comment on the stability
of classification with respect to model specification.
At the level of observed data, risk taking behavior can be conveniently summarized
by relative risk premia RRP = (ev − ce)/|ev|, where ev denotes the expected value of
a lottery’s payoff and ce stands for its certainty equivalent. RRP > 0 indicates risk
aversion, RRP < 0 risk seeking, and RRP = 0 risk neutrality. In the context of EUT,
risk preferences are captured solely by the curvature of the utility function, which in
turn determines the sign of relative risk premia. Therefore, the sign of RRP should
be independent of p, the probability of the more extreme lottery outcome. In Figures
2.2 through 2.4, median risk premia sorted by p show a systematic relationship between
RRP and p, however: In all three data sets subjects’ choices display a fourfold pattern, i.e.
they are risk averse for low-probability losses and high-probability gains, and they are risk
seeking for low-probability gains and high-probability losses. Therefore, at a first glance,
average behavior is adequately described by a model such as CPT rather than EUT. The
median RRP s gloss over an important feature of the data, however: As the following
discussion shows, there is substantial latent heterogeneity in risk taking behavior, which
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Figure 2.3: Median Relative Risk Premia Zurich 2006
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Figure 2.4: Median Relative Risk Premia Beijing 2005
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Table 2.3: Average Normalized Entropy, C = 2
Zurich 03 Zurich 06 Beijing 05 Pooled
ANE 0.049 0.033 0.031 0.035
is uncovered by the finite mixture regressions.
2.4.1 Clean and Robust Segregation of Behavioral Types
In order to be of value to applied economics, a classification of risk taking behavior should
meet two conditions: First, it should be clean, i.e. all the individuals should be clearly
associated with one specific risk taking type. Second, the classification should be robust
across different experiments. Regarding the first condition, entropy criteria, based on
the posterior probabilities of group assignment, can be used to evaluate the quality of
classification. One such measure is the Average Normalized Entropy ANE (El-Gamal
and Grether, 1995), defined as
ANE = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
τic logC (τic) , (2.7)
for C groups and N individuals. This measure has the nice feature of lying within [0, 1],
as it is normalized by taking logC . If all the τic are equal to zero or one, ANE = 0. In this
case, all the individuals can be perfectly assigned to one of the different behavioral groups.
ANE = 1 reflects maximum entropy, i.e. all the τic are equal to 1/C. Such a result would
indicate that group membership is totally ambiguous and that categorization has failed.
If this were the case, the model’s assumption that there is a specific number of distinct
types in the population could be refuted and, thus, using a finite mixture regression model
would be inappropriate.
Since the finite mixture regression model provides a classification of individuals with
respect to a pre-specified number of types, this number has to be assumed a priori. A
natural starting point is to assume C = 2 and search for two distinct types, as previous
empirical evidence suggests that there is a mix of EUT types and Non-EUT types in
the population. The ANE for the two-group classifications estimated from our data are
29
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Posterior Probability of Assignment to EUT, τEUT
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displayed in Table 2.3. All three classifications exhibit an average entropy of less than
5% of the maximal entropy of one, which is an extremely low degree of ambiguity by any
standard. In their experiment on Bayesian learning, for instance, El-Gamal and Grether
(1995) find the average entropy to lie between 11% and 38%, which they interpret to be
“quite small”. When pooling all three data sets, ANE amounts to 3.5%, underscoring
the clean segregation of individuals into two distinct risk taking types even in a culturally
diverse subject pool such as ours. These low values of ANE in our analysis indicate
that nearly all the individuals can be unambiguously assigned to one distinct type of risk
taking behavior.
The high quality of the two-group classifications can also be inferred directly from the
distributions of the individuals’ posterior probabilities of group assignment. In Figure 2.5,
τEUT denotes the posterior probability of belonging to the first group, which can indeed
be characterized, as we will demonstrate below, as expected utility maximizers. As the
distributions of τEUT show, the individuals’ posterior probabilities of behaving consistently
with EUT are either close to one or close to zero for practically all the individuals in all
three data sets, indicating an extremely clean segregation of subjects to types. Our result
is quite remarkable as it substantiates that there are two distinct types in the population,
be it Swiss, Chinese or culturally mixed, as in the pooled data set, and not a continuity
of heterogeneous types. And it also shows that the underlying behavioral model provides
a sound basis of discriminating between them.
With respect to the second criterion, robustness of classification, Figure 2.5 illustrates
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the probably most striking result of our study, namely similar distributions of types across
all three data sets. In all three histograms of Figure 2.5, there are about four times as
many individuals with τEUT close to zero, compared to individuals with τEUT close to one.
This finding is mirrored by the estimates of the mixing proportions pic. Table 2.4 displays,
for the individual and the pooled data sets, the group-specific parameter estimates of the
finite mixture regression model and their standard errors, obtained by the bootstrap
method with 4, 000 replications (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). In all the cases, estimates
of the first groups’ fractions amount to about 20% and, consequently, to about 80% for
the second group. Moreover, the 95%-confidence intervals for the estimates of pic for all
three data sets overlap. Therefore, the classification is not only unambiguous, but also
results in roughly equal proportions of both types across our data sets, demonstrating
that classification is robust to experimental design, time and place.
This finding leads us to the next question. Do the respective types identified in each
data set also exhibit similar patterns of behavior? This question will be addressed in the
following two sections, dedicated to the characterization of the two endogenously defined
types of behavior.
2.4.2 Characterization of the Minority Type
The first type of individuals encompasses about 20% of the subjects in all three data sets,
thus constituting the minority types. Risk taking behavior is represented by the parameter
estimates of the value functions and probability weighting functions. Concerning the latter
model component, Table 2.4 displays almost identical parameter estimates across all three
data sets. Without having imposed any restrictions on the parameters, we find that the
minority groups’ probability weighting functions are roughly linear, as the parameter
estimates for both γ and δ are close to one. Since the probability weights are a nonlinear
combination of these parameters, inference needs to be based on γ and δ jointly. It
could well be the case that one of the two parameter estimates is significantly different
from one, but the confidence band of the curve still includes the diagonal. Therefore,
we constructed the 95%-confidence bands for the probability weighting curves by the
percentile bootstrap method. Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 contain the graphs of the type-
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Table 2.4: Classification of Behavior
EUT Types CPT Types
Parameters ZH 03 ZH 06 BJ 05 Pooled ZH 03 ZH 06 BJ 05 Pooled
pi 0.176 0.224 0.201 0.195 0.824 0.776 0.799 0.805
(0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.012) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.012)
Gains
α 0.983 0.989 1.083 0.984 1.056 0.901 0.379 0.940
(0.012) (0.018) (0.103) (0.011) (0.021) (0.026) (0.105) (0.013)
γ 0.952 0.945 0.911 0.943 0.414 0.425 0.242 0.375
(0.014) (0.020) (0.034) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.009)
δ 0.907 0.909 0.889 0.910 0.846 0.862 1.335 0.930
(0.012) (0.019) (0.054) (0.011) (0.021) (0.028) (0.074) (0.012)
Losses
β 1.009 1.014 1.020 1.015 1.108 1.121 1.156 1.140
(0.017) (0.024) (0.087) (0.012) (0.027) (0.047) (0.108) (0.018)
γ 0.871 0.953 0.948 0.948 0.417 0.452 0.306 0.397
(0.042) (0.020) (0.040) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010)
δ 0.966 1.049 1.066 1.070 1.021 1.060 0.925 0.988
(0.059) (0.033) (0.066) (0.024) (0.027) (0.044) (0.054) (0.015)
lnL 20,493 11,336 10,244 41,811
Parameters 375 249 319 917
Observations 9,005 4,669 4,281 17,955
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the percentile bootstrap method with 4,000
replications.
Parameters include additional estimates for ξˆi for domain- and individual-specific error variances.
ZH stands for Zurich, BJ for Beijing.
specific probability weighting functions for each decision domain. The gray dotted lines
correspond to the estimated curves for the first type, referred to as “EUT type”, and the
gray dashed lines delimit their respective confidence bands. For both gains and losses,
the confidence bands for the first type in fact include the diagonal over a wide range of
probabilities, demonstrating high conformity with linear probability weighting. Where
the confidence bands do not include the diagonal, the curves still lie extremely close to
linear weighting. In sum, in all three data sets, we find the first behavioral type to exhibit
near linear probability weighting.
Concerning the second model component, the valuation of monetary outcomes, the
estimated parameters α and β also display a high degree of conformity. As can be inferred
from the bootstrapped standard errors in Table 2.4, the 95%-confidence intervals of each
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Figure 2.6: Probability Weighting Functions Zurich 2003
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Figure 2.7: Probability Weighting Functions Zurich 2006
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Figure 2.8: Probability Weighting Functions Beijing 2005
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single curvature estimate contains the value of one, implying that the hypothesis of linear
value functions cannot be rejected. Together with near linear probability weighting, this
result justifies regarding the first type of individuals as largely consistent with expected
value maximization, and therefore EUT.
The discriminatory power of the classification procedure can also be traced at the
behavioral level. After assigning the subjects to one of the two types based on their τic,
the observed relative risk premia can be broken down by type as depicted in Figure 2.9,
exemplary for the Chinese data set. As can be seen, median RRP of the Chinese EUT
types are close to zero, reflecting near risk neutral behavior in accordance with expected
value maximization. A similar picture can be shown to emerge for the Zurich 2003 and
Zurich 2006 data sets. These findings document that not only the mix of behavioral types,
but also the characterization of the minority type as essentially consistent with EUT is
robust to experimental design, time and place.
2.4.3 Characterization of the Majority Type
The following results characterize the second, much larger, groups of individuals. As al-
ready suggested by the observed average patterns of risk attitudes, depicted in Figures
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Figure 2.9: Median Relative Risk Premia by Type Beijing 2005
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2.2 through 2.4, majority behavior exhibits a substantial dependence on the level of prob-
ability. The majority types’ probability weighting curves are pictured as black lines in
Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. The solid lines correspond to the estimated curves, the dashed
lines mark the corresponding 95%-confidence bands. For both gains and losses, all three
figures show inverted S-shaped probability weighting functions. Consequently, we label
these individuals as “CPT types”. However, CPT individuals do not display as uniform a
behavior as the EUT individuals: Depending on decision domain, the parameter estimates
in Table 2.4 reveal substantial cultural differences.
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In the gain domain, the Swiss probability weighting curves exhibit the familiar shape,
i.e. intersection with the diagonal at probabilities of about 0.4, whereas the Chinese
probability weighting function is much more elevated than the Swiss ones, implying sub-
stantially more optimistic weighting of gain probabilities (estimated δ = 1.335 versus 0.846
and 0.862, respectively). The Chinese probability weighting function is also considerably
flatter in the middle part than the Swiss curves, which indicates a lower sensitivity to-
wards changes in probabilities (estimated γ = 0.242 versus 0.414 and 0.425, respectively).
Similarly, cultural differences are evident in the estimated value function parameters.
Contrary to the slightly concave or convex Swiss curvatures, the Chinese value function
is distinctly concave (estimated α = 0.38).
In the loss domain, however, cultural differences are almost absent. The value function
parameters β as well as the elevation parameters δ are estimated to be of the same orders
of magnitude in Switzerland and in China. The Chinese probability weighting curve for
losses departs more strongly from linearity, however, as the estimated slope parameter
is significantly smaller than the corresponding Swiss values (estimated γ = 0.306 versus
0.417 and 0.452, respectively). This insensitivity to changes in probabilities seems to be
a general feature of Chinese behavior.
The difference detected in the value function curvatures also has a bearing on loss
aversion. As discussed in Section 2.3, the existence of loss aversion can be inferred from
the difference in the domain-specific curvatures. If the estimated β is larger than α, “losses
loom larger than corresponding gains”. This is clearly the case for Zurich 06, but not for
Zurich 03. Substantial loss aversion is also present in the Beijing 05 data set, another
feature of cross cultural differences.
Tracing behavior of the CPT types at the level of observed RRP in Figure 2.9, we find
a pronounced fourfold pattern of Chinese risk attitudes, with more extreme departures
from risk neutrality than the aggregate risk premia in Figure 2.4. As before, a similar
picture can be shown to emerge for the Zurich 2003 and Zurich 2006 data. This find-
ing demonstrates that aggregate data underestimate the true extent of the CPT types’
probability distortions.
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2.4.4 Robustness to Model Specification
The final part of our analysis concerns questions of model specification. First, we discuss
the issue of the correct number of groups in the finite mixture regression model. Second,
we address an essential issue for prospect theory, namely, the assumption on the reference
point implicit in our approach.
So far our results are based on the assumption of two distinct types, derived from
the hypothesized co-existence of EUT and Non-EUT decision makers. In some applied
contexts, it may be interesting to see what happens to classification when three groups
are allowed for. If three types rendered a better characterization of risk taking behavior
than two types, the Average Normalized Entropy should be smaller for C = 3 than for
C = 2. Given the extremely low degree of entropy in our two-group classifications, an
improvement in entropy, when three groups are assumed, seems hardly possible, however.
Table 2.5 shows that ANE is indeed smaller for the two-group classifications than for the
three-group classifications in all the cases. Moreover, we ascertained that relative group
sizes as well as group membership of the EUT groups remain stable, when three-group
models are estimated. Thus, regardless of whether C = 2 or C = 3 is assumed, the
percentage of EUT types in the overall population amounts to approximately 20%. The
CPT groups, however, get subdivided into two different CPT types, each characterized by
a specific variety of nonlinear probability weighting, as there is some heterogeneity within
the original CPT groups. Evidently, as the higher entropy measures for C = 3 in Table
2.5 show, these newly emerging types do not differ from each other as distinctly as do
the overall CPT groups from EUT, since a number of CPT individuals cannot be clearly
associated with one type, but are more suitably characterized by a mix of both types of
CPT.
The second issue of interest concerns the question of reference point. Since prospect
theory is silent on the subject of what “gains” and “losses” actually stand for, subjects’
reference points might be different from the ones the experimenter tries to induce, i.e.
the endowment. For instance, people may not evaluate gambles in isolation, but integrate
the prospective outcomes with their wealth or consumption spending. Therefore, we re-
estimated the model with the value function being defined over the sum of the prospective
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Table 2.5: Average Normalized Entropy by Number of Groups C
Groups Zurich 03 Zurich 06 Beijing 05 Pooled
C = 2 0.049 0.033 0.031 0.035
C = 3 0.052 0.034 0.049 0.072
lottery outcome and an additional type-specific background parameter k, such that v(x) =
(x+k)α over gains and mutatis mutandis over losses. When such an endogenous reference
point is included in the model, all our main results remain unchanged: In the extended
model, the distributions of distinct behavioral types amount to roughly 20:80 in all three
data sets. Segregation is extremely clean just as in the original model, and both EUT-
and CPT-group memberships remain unchanged, with only 2 (!) of the 452 individuals
not assigned to their original type. These findings confirm that there are two types of
decision makers, consistent with EUT and CPT, respectively, and that classification is
robust to model specification.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
We conducted three experiments based on the same design principles and applied a finite
mixture regression model to the resulting data. For all three data sets a coherent picture
emerges. Irrespective of composition of tasks, framing of the decisions, time and place of
the experiments, we find an equal mix of two distinct groups. The classification procedure
performs extremely well, resulting in less than 5% of the maximal Average Normalized
Entropy, which means that almost all the individuals are reliably assigned to either one
of the two distinct types. As it turns out, it is predominantly subjects’ proneness to
distorting stated probabilities that defines their behavioral type.
The first group comprises about 20% of the subjects, be they Swiss or Chinese, whose
behavior can essentially be characterized by near linear probability weighting. Moreover,
value function curvature estimates are not statistically different from linearity, implying
near risk neutral behavior in line with the prediction of Rabin’s calibration theorem.
Consequently, we label this group of individuals EUT types.
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The second group, encompassing approximately 80% of the subjects, can be classified
as prospect theory types exhibiting an inverted S-shaped probability weighting function.
In contrast to the EUT types, the overall group of CPT individuals, while sharing a general
proneness to nonlinear probability weighting, is more heterogeneous. We find cultural
differences particularly in choices over gains. While in the loss domain the behavior of
the CPT types can be described by remarkably similar parameter values, Chinese CPT
subjects tend to weight gain probabilities much more optimistically than do Swiss CPT
subjects. The Chinese are also less responsive to changes in probabilities and display
a substantial degree of loss aversion. When we estimate risk premia over a comparable
range of outcomes, we predict the Chinese to be more risk seeking than the Swiss for gains
of low and medium probability. Previous studies show that Chinese respondents indeed
are relatively more risk seeking on average than Western ones (Kachelmeier and Shehata,
1992; Hsee and Weber, 1999). These results are consistent with our estimates and can
be explained predominantly by the specific shape of the Chinese probability weighting
function.
When we started this project we were quite confident that we would find a considerable
fraction of expected utility maximizers. What really surprised us is the robust percentage
of EUT types, even across two so different cultures as the Swiss and Chinese. This
consistent magnitude of the EUT groups lends support to prior evidence by Hey and
Orme (1994) and Lattimore et al. (1992). These near rational actors constitute a non-
negligible proportion of the population whose behavior, depending on the nature of the
strategic environment, may be decisive for aggregate outcomes. The existence of a robust
share of near rational actors suggests to use a mix of preference theories for modeling
behavior rather than a single theory, which would yield systematically biased results.
Moreover, for the majority of subjects, prospect theory adequately describes behavior,
but the parameter estimates exhibit culture-specific values. Researchers should take this
evidence into account when constructing, estimating, and applying models of choice under
risk.
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2.6 Appendix: Estimation of the Finite Mixture Re-
gression Model
As it is generally the case in finite mixture models, direct maximization of the log likeli-
hood function
lnL (Ψ; ce,G) =
N∑
i=1
ln
C∑
c=1
pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi) (2.8)
may encounter several problems, even if it is in principle feasible (for a general treatise
see for example McLachlan and Peel (2000)). First, the highly non-linear form of the log
likelihood causes the optimization algorithm to be rather slow or even incapable of finding
the maximum. Second, the likelihood of a finite mixture model is often multimodal and
therefore we have no guaranty that a standard optimization routine will converge towards
the global maximum rather than to one of the local maxima.
However, if individual group membership were observable and indicated by tic ∈ {0, 1}
the individual contribution to the likelihood function would be given by
,˜ (Ψi; cei,G, ti) =
C∏
c=1
[pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi)]tic (2.9)
By using the above formulation and taking logarithms, the complete-data log likelihood
function
ln L˜ (Ψ; ce,G, t) =
N∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
tic [ln pic + ln f (cei,G; θc, ξi)] (2.10)
would follow directly. As relative group sizes sum up to one, their maximum likelihood
estimates, pˆic = 1/N
∑N
i=1 tic, would be given analytically by the relative number of indi-
viduals in the respective group. Furthermore, the maximum likelihood estimates of the
group-specific parameters could be obtained separately in each group by numerically max-
imizing the corresponding joint density function which would simplify the optimization
problem considerably.
The EM algorithm proceeds iteratively in two steps, E and M, while it treats the
unobservable tic as missing data. In the E-step of the (k+1)-th iteration the expectation of
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the complete-data log likelihood L˜, given the actual fit of the data Ψ(k), is computed. This
yields, according to Bayes’ law, the posterior probabilities of individual group membership
τic
(
cei,G;Ψ(k)i
)
=
pi(k)c f
(
cei,G; θ(k)c , ξ(k)i
)
∑C
m=1 pi
(k)
m f
(
cei,G; θ(k)m , ξ(k)i
) (2.11)
which replace the unknown indicators of individual group membership, tic. Given these
posterior probabilities τic
(
cei,G;Ψ(k)i
)
, the complete-data log likelihood, L˜, is maximized
in the following M-step which yields the updates of the model parameters,
pi(k+1)c =
1
N
N∑
i=1
τic
(
cei,G;Ψ(k)i
)
, (2.12)
and(
θ(k+1)1 , . . . , θ
(k+1)
C , ξ
(k+1)
1 , . . . , ξ
(k+1)
N
)
= (2.13)
argmax
θ1,...,θC ,ξ1,...,ξN
N∑
i=1
C∑
m=1
τim
(
cei,G;Ψ(k)i
)
ln f
(
cei,G; θ(k)m , ξ(k)i
)
.
As Dempster et al. (1977) show, the likelihood never decreases from one iteration to
the next, i.e. L
(
Ψ(k+1); ce,G) ≥ L (Ψ(k); ce,G), which makes the EM algorithm con-
verge monotonically towards the nearest maximum of the likelihood function regardless
whether this maximum is global or just local. In the Zurich 2003 data set, we therefore
needed to apply a stochastic extension, the Simulated Annealing Expectation Maximiza-
tion (SAEM) algorithm proposed by Celeux et al. (1996), in order to overcome the EM
algorithm’s tendency to converge towards local maxima. In each iteration, there is a
non-zero probability that the SAEM algorithm leaves the current optimization path and
starts over in a different region of the likelihood function which results in much higher
chances of finding the global maximum. But this robustness against multimodality of the
objective function comes at the cost of much higher computational demands.
As the EM algorithm is computationally highly demanding, even in its basic form,
and tends to become tediously slow when close to convergence our estimation routine
relies on a hybrid estimation algorithm (Render and Walker, 1984): It first uses either the
EM or the SAEM algorithm and takes advantage of their robustness before it switches
to the direct maximization of the log likelihood by the much faster BFGS algorithm.
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The estimation routine in this form turned out to be efficient and robust as it reliably
converged towards the same maximum likelihood estimates regardless of the randomly
chosen start values.
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Chapter 3
Rationality on the Rise:
Why Relative Risk Aversion
Increases with Stake Size
This chapter is joint work with Helga Fehr and Thomas Epper.
Another version of this chapter has been published as SOI Working Paper 0708 and is
currently under review at the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
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3.1 Introduction
Risk is a ubiquitous feature of social and economic life. Many of our decisions, such as
what trade to learn and where to live, involve risky consequences of great importance.
Often these choices entail substantial monetary costs and rewards. Therefore, risk taking
behavior under high stakes is a relevant area of economic research. The effect of high stakes
on risk tolerance has been debated since the early days of expected utility theory. In a
seminal paper, Markowitz (1952) argued that risk preferences are likely to reverse from
risk seeking over very small stakes to risk aversion over high stakes. While Markowitz
did not test this conjecture experimentally, there is evidence by now that relative risk
aversion is indeed greater when substantial amounts of money are at stake (Binswanger,
1981; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Holt and Laury, 2002), at least on average. Most
economists would attribute this change in relative risk aversion to the characteristics of
the utility for money, and would search for suitable functional forms that are able to
accommodate this behavioral pattern. Little is known about the underlying forces of the
increase in relative risk aversion, however. In particular, it is not clear whether this change
is actually a consequence of the way people value low versus high amounts of money, or
whether some other component of lottery evaluation, such as probability weighting, is
the driving force. Moreover, results based on aggregate data may gloss over potentially
important differences in individual behavior.
In order to close this gap, we analyze comprehensive choice data stemming from an
experiment conducted in Beijing in 2005. The experimental subjects had to take decisions
over substantial real monetary stakes with maximum payoffs amounting to more than an
average subject’s monthly income. The lotteries presented to the subjects were framed
as gains and as losses in order to be able to investigate the effect of increasing stake size
on relative risk aversion in both decision domains. To disentangle the effects of stake
size on the valuation of monetary outcomes and probability weighting, we estimated the
parameters of a flexible sign- and rank-dependent decision model, which nests expected
utility theory as a special case. Furthermore, to account for the existence of heterogeneous
preference types, we used a finite mixture regression model, which assigns each individual
to one of several distinct behavioral types and provides type-specific parameter estimates
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for the underlying decision model (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995;
Houser et al., 2004).
The following results emerge from our analysis. First, we find a strong and significant
framing effect in subjects’ evaluations of risky gains and losses. Whereas observed cer-
tainty equivalents over rising gains exhibit significantly increasing relative risk aversion,
there is no coherent stake-dependent pattern in subject’s behavior over identical lotteries
framed as losses.
Second, contrary to many economists’ expectations, value function parameters remain
stable over increased stakes in both decision domains, implying that the observed increase
in average relative risk aversion over gains cannot be explained by changing attitudes
towards monetary outcomes. Rather, it can be predominantly attributed to a change in
probability weighting. The probability weighting function for high stakes deviates less
strongly from rational linear weighting than the respective function for low stakes. This
change is particularly pronounced over the range of smaller probabilities, entailing less
optimistic lottery evaluation at high stakes and, thus, increasing relative risk aversion. In
the loss domain, however, no such change in probability weights can be inferred from the
data.
Third, when allowing for heterogeneity of preference types, we find two distinct be-
havioral groups: The majority of about 73% of the subjects exhibit an inverted S-shaped
probability weighting curve, whereas the minority can essentially be characterized as ex-
pected value maximizers. Furthermore, we show that the observed increase in average
relative risk aversion over gains can exclusively be attributed to a change in behavior
by the majority group of decision makers, who evaluate high-stake prospects more cau-
tiously by putting lower weights on stated gain probabilities. In contrast, the minority
type’s behavior is not affected by rising stakes at all.
Our results entail material consequences for decision theory as well as applied eco-
nomics. The first two findings, the framing effect as well as the probability weighting
function as carrier of changing risk attitudes, effectively rule out expected utility the-
ory as a candidate for explaining increasing relative risk aversion at the aggregate level.
Since it is the probability weights which are responsible for the change in relative risk
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aversion, using more flexible utility functions cannot adequately solve the problem of
modelling increasing risk aversion. While the observed framing effect lends support to
using sign-dependent decision models, such as prospect theory, stake dependence of prob-
ability weights, however, calls theories based on stake-invariant probability weighting into
question. The third finding poses a challenge to type-independent models of choice under
risk, which might be prone to aggregation bias. We show that the vast heterogeneity in
individual risk taking behavior, typically found in choice data (Hey and Orme, 1994), is
substantive in the sense that a single preference model is unable to adequately describe
behavior. This heterogeneity may render policy recommendations based on average pa-
rameter estimates inappropriate. Moreover, the mix of different types may be decisive for
aggregate outcomes, as the literature on the role of bounded rationality under strategic
complementarity and substitutability has shown (Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985, 1989;
Fehr and Tyran, 2005). The researcher will, therefore, need to deal with the potential
stake sensitivity of the pivotal group.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that provides a systematic exam-
ination of stake effects on probability weights for real substantial payoffs. Neither are we
aware of any other study that examines the relevance of framing and type heterogeneity
for the impact of stakes on risk tolerance. Previous studies have focused on gains, on
hypothetical payoffs or on quite limited payoff ranges, and have usually not addressed
the issue of nonlinear probability weighting (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990; Camerer, 1991;
Bosch-Domenech and Silvestre, 1999; Kuehberger et al., 1999; Etchart-Vincent, 2004; We-
ber and Chapman, 2005). One exception is the experiment by Etchart-Vincent (2004),
which investigates the probability weighting function under low and high hypothetical
losses. As Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) have convincingly demonstrated, however, it may
make a difference whether choices are hypothetical or for real money. They found that,
contrary to real payoffs, relative risk aversion does not change significantly with increasing
hypothetical stakes.
One of the few previous experiments using substantial real monetary incentives, namely
the study by Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992), was also conducted in Beijing. Our work
distinguishes itself from theirs in several important respects, however. First of all, our
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experimental design is not confined to lotteries framed as gains. Second, observed cer-
tainty equivalents in our data set show a clearly defined fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
for both low stakes and high stakes, i.e. risk aversion for high-probability gains and low-
probability losses, as well as risk seeking for low-probability gains and high-probability
losses, whereas Kachelmeier and Shehata find practically no risk aversion in choices over
low stakes. The authors attribute this lack of risk aversion to the specifics of their elic-
itation procedure: Certainty equivalents were elicited as minimum selling prices, which
seems to have induced a kind of loss aversion in subjects’ responses. This might have led
otherwise risk averse subjects to reveal risk neutral or risk seeking prices rather than lose
their lottery endowment (Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992), p. 1133). What Kachelmeier
and Shehata do find in observed certainty equivalents, however, is that stake size inter-
acts significantly with probability level, which is in line with our findings, but their data
set is not sufficiently rich to draw any conclusions on relative contributions of outcome
valuation and probability weighting, nor do they address the issue of heterogeneity.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the experimental design and
procedures. The decision model applied to the experimental data as well as the finite
mixture regression model are presented in Section 3.3. The results of the estimation
procedure are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes the paper.
3.2 Experiment
In the following section, the experimental setup and procedures are described. The ex-
periment took place in Beijing in November 2005. The subjects were recruited by flier
distributed at the campusses of Peking University and Tsinhua University. Interested
people had to register by email for one of two sessions conducted on the same day. Par-
ticipants were selected to guarantee a balanced distribution of genders and fields of study.
In total, 153 subjects’ responses were analyzed.
The experiment served to elicit certainty equivalents for 56 two-outcome lotteries.
Twenty-eight lotteries offered low-stake outcomes ranging from 4 to 55 Chinese Yuan
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Table 3.1: Gain Lotteries (x1, p;x2)
p x1 x2 p x1 x2 p x1 x2
0.05 15 4 0.25 250 65 0.75 250 65
0.05 20 7 0.25 320 130 0.75 320 130
0.05 55 20 0.50 7 4 0.90 7 4
0.05 250 65 0.50 15 4 0.90 130 65
0.05 320 130 0.50 20 7 0.95 15 4
0.05 950 320 0.50 130 65 0.95 20 7
0.10 7 4 0.50 250 65 0.95 250 65
0.10 130 65 0.50 320 130 0.95 320 130
0.25 15 4 0.75 15 4
0.25 20 7 0.75 20 7
Outcomes x1 and x2 are denominated in Chinese Yuan.
p denotes the probability of the higher gain.
(CHN), another 28 lotteries entailed high-stake outcomes from 65 to 950 CHN1. Average
earnings per subject amounted to approximately 323 CHN, including a show up fee of
20 CHN. Monetary incentives were substantial given the participants’ average monthly
disposable income of about 700 CHN. Besides, the low-stake outcomes were quite salient
by themselves, as the expected payoff over low-stake lotteries amounted to about 16 CHN,
considerably more than the going hourly wage rate. Probabilities of the lotteries’ higher
gain or loss varied from 5% to 95%. One half of the lotteries were framed as choices
between risky and certain gains (“gain domain”); the same decisions were also presented
as choices between risky and certain losses (“loss domain”). For each lottery in the loss
domain, subjects were provided with a specific endowment which served to cover their
potential losses. These initial endowments rendered the expected payoff for each loss
lottery equal to the expected payoff of an equivalent gain lottery. The set of gain lotteries
is presented in Table 3.1.
Subjects were entitled to one random draw from their low-stake decisions and to one
random draw from their high-stake decisions. In order to preclude order effects, low-
stake and high-stake lotteries were intermixed and appeared in random order in a booklet
containing the decision sheets.
For each lottery, a decision sheet, such as presented in Figure 3.1, contained the
1At the time of the experiment one Chinese Yuan equalled about 0.12 U.S. Dollars.
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Figure 3.1: Design of the Decision Sheet
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specifics of the lottery and a list of 20 equally spaced certain outcomes ranging from
the lottery’s maximum payoff to the lottery’s minimum payoff. Subjects had to indicate
whether they preferred the lottery or the certain payoff for each row of the decision sheet.
The lottery’s certainty equivalent was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the smallest
certain amount preferred to the lottery and the following certain amount on the list, when
subjects had, for the first time, reported preferring the lottery. For example, if a subject
had decided as indicated by the small circles in Figure 3.1, her certainty equivalent would
amount to 13.5 CHN.
Before subjects were permitted to start working on the experimental decisions, they
were presented with two hypothetical choices to become familiar with the procedure.
Subjects could work at their own speed. The vast majority of them needed considerably
less than 90 minutes to complete the experiment. At the end of the experiment, one
of their low-stake choices and one of their high-stake choices were randomly selected for
payment. Subjects were paid in private afterward.
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3.3 Econometric Model
This section discusses the specification of the finite mixture regression model, which allows
controlling for latent heterogeneity in risk taking behavior. Such an approach requires
several building blocks: first, specifying the basic decision model; second, allowing for
potentially different behaviors under low and high stakes; third, specifying the error term;
and finally, accounting for heterogeneity in behavior.
3.3.1 The Basic Decision Model
The underlying model of decision under risk should be able to accommodate a wide range
of different behaviors. Sign- and rank-dependent models, such as cumulative prospect
theory (CPT), capture two robust empirical phenomena: nonlinear probability weighting
and loss aversion (Starmer, 2000). Therefore, a flexible approach, such as proposed by
CPT, lends itself to describing risk taking behavior. According to CPT, an individual
values any binary gamble Gg = (x1g, pg;x2g), g ∈ {1, . . . , G}, where |x1g| > |x2g|, by
v (Gg) = v(x1g)w(pg) + v(x2g)(1− w(pg)). (3.1)
The function v(x) describes how monetary outcomes x are valued, whereas the function
w(p) assigns a subjective weight to every outcome probability p. The gamble’s certainty
equivalent cˆeg can then be written as
cˆeg = v
−1 [v(x1g)w(pg) + v(x2g)(1− w(pg))] . (3.2)
In order to make CPT operational we have to assume specific functional forms for the
value function v(x) and the probability weighting function w(p). A natural candidate for
v(x) is a sign-dependent power function
v(x) =
 xα if x ≥ 0−(−x)β otherwise, (3.3)
which can be conveniently interpreted and which has also turned out to be the best
compromise between parsimony and goodness of fit in the context of prospect theory
(Stott, 2006). For this specification of the value function, the existence of loss aversion can
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be inferred from the difference in the domain-specific curvatures. According to Tversky
and Kahneman, loss aversion, in the sense that “losses loom larger than corresponding
gains”, is present if v′(x) < v′(−x) for x ≥ 0 (Tversky and Kahneman (1992), p. 303).
This is the case if the estimated β is significantly larger than α.
A variety of functions for modeling probability weights w(p) have been proposed in
the literature (Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Prelec, 1998). We use the
two-parameter specification suggested by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) as well as by
Lattimore et al. (1992):
w(p) =
δpγ
δpγ + (1− p)γ , δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0. (3.4)
We favor this specification because it has proven to account well for individual hetero-
geneity (Wu et al., 2004) and its parameters have an intuitively appealing interpretation:2
The parameter γ largely governs the slope of the curve, whereas the parameter δ largely
governs its elevation. The smaller the value of γ, the more strongly the probability weight-
ing function deviates from linear weighting. The larger the value of δ, the more elevated
the curve, ceteris paribus. Linear weighting is characterized by γ = δ = 1. In a sign-
dependent model, the parameters may take on different values for gains and for losses,
yielding a total of six behavioral parameters to be estimated.
3.3.2 Stake Dependence
In order to address our focal question of stake size effects, we introduce a dummy vari-
able HIGH into the basic decision model, such that HIGH = 1 if the lottery under
consideration contains high-stake payoffs amounting to at least 65 CHN, and HIGH = 0
otherwise. Each one of the model parameters ω ∈ {α, β, γ′, δ′}, with γ′ and δ′ containing
the domain-specific parameters for the slope and the elevation of the probability weighting
functions, is assumed to depend linearly on HIGH in the following fashion:
ω = ω0 + ωHIGH ×HIGH, (3.5)
2Moreover, the function generally fits equally well as the two-parameter functional developed by Prelec
(1998).
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with ω0 representing the respective low-stake parameters. This step adds another six
additional behavioral parameters to be estimated. If relative risk aversion indeed changes
with stake size, at least one of the coefficients of the high-stake dummy HIGH should
turn out to be significantly different from zero. In particular, if the valuation of monetary
outcomes is the driving force behind changing risk tolerance, the respective coefficients
should be material in size and statistically significant, since the power functional, used
for estimation, cannot account for changing relative risk aversion. If the estimates of
αHIGH or βHIGH were indeed significant, the present model would be mis-specified and
an alternative specification of the value function that can account for changing relative
risk aversion would be called for.
3.3.3 Error Specification
We now turn to the next step of model specification. In the course of the experiment, risk
taking behavior of individual i ∈ {1, . . . , N} was measured by her certainty equivalents
ceig for a set of different lotteries. Since CPT explains deterministic choice, the predicted
certainty equivalents cˆeg are bound to deviate from the actual certainty equivalents ceig
by an error (ig, i.e. ceig = cˆeg + (ig. There may be different sources of error, such as
carelessness, hurry or inattentiveness, resulting in accidentally wrong answers (Hey and
Orme, 1994). The Central Limit Theorem supports the assumption that the errors are
normally distributed and simply add white noise.
Furthermore, we allow for three different sources of heteroskedasticity in the error
variance. First, for each lottery subjects have to consider 20 certain outcomes, which are
equally spaced throughout the lottery’s range |x1g − x2g|. Since the observed certainty
equivalent ceig is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the smallest certain amount pre-
ferred to the lottery and the following certain amount, where the lottery is preferred,
the error is proportional to the lottery range, which has to be taken account of by the
estimation procedure. Second, as subjects may be heterogeneous with respect to their
previous knowledge, their ability of finding the correct certainty equivalent as well as their
attention span, we expect the error variance to differ by individual. Third, lotteries in the
gain domain may be evaluated differently from the ones in the loss domain. Therefore,
56
we allow for domain-specific variance in the error term. This yields the form
σig = ξi|x1g − x2g| (3.6)
for the standard deviation of the error term distribution, where ξi denotes an individual
domain-specific parameter. Note that the model allows to test for both individual-specific
and domain-specific heteroskedasticity by either imposing the restriction ξi = ξ, or by
forcing all the ξi to be equal in both decision domains. Both restrictions are rejected
by their corresponding likelihood ratio tests with p-values close to zero. Therefore, we
control for all three types of heteroskedasticity in the estimation procedure.
3.3.4 Accounting for Heterogeneity
A suitable estimation procedure, such as maximum likelihood, yields estimates for the av-
erage values of the parameters θ = (α′, β′, γ′, δ′)′. If there is heterogeneity of a substantive
kind, i.e. if there are several distinct data generating processes, estimating a single set of
parameters is inappropriate and may render misleading results. For this reason, we esti-
mate a finite mixture model in order to account for heterogeneity. The basic idea of the
mixture model is assigning an individual’s risk-taking choices to one of C different types
of behavior, each characterized by a distinct vector of parameters θc = (α′c, β
′
c, γ
′
c, δ
′
c)
′,
c ∈ {1, . . . , C}. The estimation procedure yields estimates of the relative sizes of the
different groups, the mixing proportions pic, as well as the group-specific parameters θc of
the underlying behavioral model. Given our assumptions on the distribution of the error
term, the density of type c for the i-th individual can be expressed as
f (cei,G; θc, ξi) =
G∏
g=1
1
σig
φ
(
ceig − cˆeg
σig
)
, (3.7)
where φ(·) denotes the density of the standard normal distribution and ξi accounts for
individual-specific heteroskedasticity. Since we do not know a priori to which group a
certain individual belongs to, the relative group sizes pic are interpreted as probabilities
of group membership. Therefore, each individual density of type c has to be weighted
by its respective mixing proportion pic, which is unknown and has to be estimated as
well. Taking the sum over the weighted type-specific densities yields the individual’s
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contribution to the model’s likelihood function L(Ψ; ce,G). The log likelihood of the
finite mixture regression model is then given by
lnL (Ψ; ce,G) =
N∑
i=1
ln
C∑
c=1
pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi), (3.8)
where the vector Ψ = (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
C , pi1, . . . ,piC−1, ξ1, . . . , ξN)
′ summarizes the parameters to
be estimated.
3.3.5 Estimation
In order to deal with the issues of non-linearity and multiple local maxima encountered
when maximizing the likelihood of a finite mixture regression model (McLachlan and
Peel, 2000), the iterative Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm is applied (Dempster
et al., 1977). This algorithm also provides an additional feature: It calculates, by Bayesian
updating in each iteration, an individual’s posterior probability τic of belonging to group c.
These posterior probabilities τic represent a particularly valuable result of the estimation
procedure. Not only does the procedure endogenously assign each individual to a specific
group, but it also provides a method of judging classification quality. If all the τic of
the final iteration are either close to zero or one, all the individuals are unambiguously
assigned to one specific group. The τic can be used to calculate a summary measure of
ambiguity, such as the Average Normalized Entropy (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995), in
order to gauge the extent of dubious assignments. If classification has been successful, a
low measure of entropy should be observed.
Furthermore, entropy measures allow the researcher to discriminate between models
with differing numbers of types. Since the finite mixture regression model is defined over
a pre-specified number of groups, a criterion for assessing the correct number of groups
is called for. In the context of mixture models, classical criteria, such as the Akaike
Information Criterion AIC or the Bayesian Information Criterion BIC, are not suited
for this purpose (Celeux and Soromenho, 1996). Celeux proposes to use entropy criteria
based on the posterior probabilities of group assignment τic instead, which are shown to
perform better than the classical criteria. For example, if entropy increases when the
number of different types is raised from two to three, group assignment of the individuals
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is less reliable, and the model tends to overfit the data. Therefore, the model with two
types is to be preferred.
Various problems may be encountered when maximizing the likelihood function of a
finite mixture regression model and, therefore, a customized estimation procedure has
to be used, which can adequately deal with these problems. Details of the estimation
procedure3 are discussed in Bruhin et al. (2007).
3.4 Results
In the following section we investigate the stake-size sensitivity of observed risk taking
behavior and present the estimates of the decision model assuming one homogeneous type
of preferences. Furthermore, we show that substantive heterogeneity is present in our data
and discuss the quality of the classification procedure and the number of heterogeneous
behavioral types identified in the data. Finally, we characterize these different types by
their average behavioral parameters and discuss the effect of stake size on each group’s
behavior.
RESULT 1: On average, observed behavior exhibits the fourfold pattern of risk atti-
tudes, predicted by prospect theory, for both low-stake and high-stake outcomes. Stake-
specific behavior is subject to a strong framing effect, however: When gains are at stake,
relative risk aversion increases with stake size at almost all levels of probability. In the
loss domain no such clear picture emerges.
Support. In Figure 3.2, observed risk taking behavior is summarized by the median
relative risk premia RRP = (ev − ce)/|ev|, where ev denotes the expected value of a
lottery’s payoff and ce stands for its certainty equivalent. RRP > 0 indicates risk aversion,
RRP < 0 risk seeking, and RRP = 0 risk neutrality. The light gray bars in Figure 3.2
represent the observed median RRP for low-stake lotteries, the ones in dark gray represent
the respective high-stake median RRP . The median relative risk premia RRP , sorted by
the probability p of the higher gain or loss, show a systematic relationship with p: For
both low stakes and high stakes, subjects’ choices display a fourfold pattern, i.e. they are
3 The procedure is written in the R environment (R Development Core Team, 2006).
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Figure 3.2: Median Relative Risk Premia by Stake Size
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risk averse for low-probability losses and high-probability gains, and they are risk seeking
for low-probability gains and high-probability losses. Therefore, at first glance, average
behavior is adequately described by a model such as CPT.
What the bar plots also reveal is that median relative risk premia differ substantially
by stake level: When subjects’ preferences exhibit increasing relative risk aversion, we
should observe different low-stake and high-stake RRP , namely, high-stake choices should
be relatively less risk tolerant than low-stake choices. Inspection of Figure 3.2 confirms
that, in the gain domain, median high-stake choices are considerably less risk seeking
for small probabilities and somewhat more risk averse for large probabilities than their
median low-stake counterparts. For losses, the evidence is not so clear-cut, however. At
some levels of probability, low-stake median RRP display relatively higher risk aversion
than high-stake RRP , at some other levels the reverse is true.
In order to judge whether the distributions of the stake-dependent RRP are signifi-
cantly different from each other, we performed a series of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for
each level of probability, which yield the following results at conventional levels of signif-
icance: With the exception of the probability of 95%, all the low-stake RRP over gains
are significantly smaller than the high-stake ones. We therefore conclude that there is a
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significant stake effect in the data on choices over gains: On average, people are relatively
more risk averse for high gains than for low gains. In the loss domain, no consistent
picture emerges: Low-stake RRP are significantly smaller at three levels of probability
(p ∈ {0.10, 0.75, 0.95}), significantly larger at one level (p = 0.05), and insignificantly
different at the remaining three levels of probability (p ∈ {0.25, 0.50, 0.90}). Therefore,
we conclude that there is no obvious systematic relationship between stake-size effect and
level of probability for loss lotteries.
Our data show behavior consistent with nonlinear probability weighting, but also a
substantial framing effect. Relative risk aversion increases with stake size, albeit only for
gains. When subjects evaluate the same lotteries framed as losses rather than as gains,
their relative risk aversion does not systematically increase. In fact, no coherent pattern
of stake-dependent behavior under losses emerges. This sensitivity to framing, already
visible at the level of observed behavior, clearly excludes expected utility theory from the
list of eligible models for describing average risk taking behavior.
We now turn to one of our major concerns, namely, whether the change in relative
risk aversion over gains can be attributed to a specific component of lottery evaluation.
First, we focus on the results for the average parameter estimates without accounting for
heterogeneity.
RESULT 2: In the homogeneous preference model, the estimated curvatures of the
value functions do not significantly change with rising stakes.
Support. Table 3.2 contains the parameter estimates for the decision model discussed
in Section 3.3. For the time being, we focus on the average parameter estimates displayed
in the two columns labeled “Pooled”. The curvature parameters of the value functions
over low stakes are denoted by α0 for gains and β0 for losses. αHIGH and βHIGH represent
the corresponding estimated coefficients of the high-stake dummy HIGH, measuring the
change in curvature brought about by increased stake levels. For both domains, the
estimates for αHIGH and βHIGH are small in size, and the bootstrapped standard errors,
reported in parentheses below the respective point estimates, indicate that the coefficients
are not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, when a restricted model with stake-
invariant curvature parameters is estimated, the likelihood ratio test of the restricted
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Table 3.2: Classification of Behavior
Gains Losses
Pooled EUT Non-EUT Pooled EUT Non-EUT
pi 0.266 0.734 pi 0.266 0.734
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
α0 0.467 0.996 0.430 β0 1.165 1.157 1.177
(0.109) (0.136) (0.116) (0.110) (0.136) (0.120)
αHIGH 0.047 -0.080 0.066 βHIGH -0.038 -0.137 -0.106
(0.158) (0.165) (0.167) (0.162) (0.178) (0.178)
γ0 0.316 0.863 0.225 γ0 0.383 0.802 0.284
(0.012) (0.067) (0.013) (0.012) (0.067) (0.012)
γHIGH 0.056 0.026 0.058 γHIGH 0.045 0.027 0.046
(0.012) (0.023) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.012)
δ0 1.304 0.952 1.265 δ0 0.913 0.912 0.917
(0.076) (0.094) (0.080) (0.052) (0.090) (0.058)
δHIGH -0.324 -0.040 -0.344 δHIGH 0.070 0.106 0.099
(0.095) (0.090) (0.098) (0.077) (0.091) (0.087)
lnL 31,536 32,580
Parameters 318 331
Observations 8,560 8,560
Standard errors in parentheses are based on the bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
Parameter vectors include estimates of ξˆi for domain- and individual-specific error variances.
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model against the unrestricted one renders a p-value of 0.911. This test result implies
that the hypothesis of equal curvatures over both ranges of outcomes cannot be rejected.
If the valuation of monetary outcomes were the carrier of increasing relative risk aver-
sion over gains, the estimates of αHIGH would have to be statistically significant and,
presumably, quite sizable, since the specification of the value function as a power function
can only accommodate constant relative risk aversion. As the estimation results show,
however, this is not the case. Therefore, we conclude that changing attitudes towards
monetary outcomes are not responsible for the observed increase in relative risk aversion.
This finding is also holds for alternative specifications of the value function that are suffi-
ciently flexible to capture changing relative risk aversion, such as the expo-power function
introduced by Saha (1993).
As the curvature of the value function is robust to stake size, the observed increase
in relative risk aversion over gains has to be driven by the other component of lottery
evaluation, probability weighting, as the next result confirms.
RESULT 3: For homogeneous preferences, low-gain probability weights deviate more
strongly from rational linear weighting than high-gain probability weights. No substantial
change in probability weights is observed for losses.
Support. We first discuss the results for the gain domain. A first indication of proba-
bility weights being the carrier of the observed stake effect for gains can already be found
in the bar plots in Figure 3.2. The differences in the stake-dependent observed RRP
decrease markedly with increasing probability level, suggesting a substantial interaction
effect. Inspection of the “Pooled”-column in the gains section of Table 3.2 indeed con-
firms that the estimated change in the elevation of the curve, measured by δHIGH , is
significantly negative and substantial in size, implying a major decrease in elevation from
1.307 to 0.979, induced by substantially less optimistic weighting of probabilities. More-
over, the change in the slope of the probability weighting function γHIGH is significantly
positive (0.056), implying a slightly less strongly S-shaped curve for high stakes. The
impact of these parameter changes on the shape of the probability weighting function can
be examined in Figure 3.3. The top panel of the figure shows, for each decision domain,
the estimated probability weighting curves for low stakes, defined by HIGH = 0, plotted
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Figure 3.3: Average Probability Weights by Stake Size
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against the high-stake curves, defined by HIGH = 1. Evidently, the low-gain function is
much more elevated and slightly more strongly curved than the high-gain function.
However, significant changes in single parameter estimates do not tell the whole story.
Since the probability weights are a nonlinear combination of two parameters, inference
needs to be based on γ and δ jointly. Therefore, the percentile bootstrap method (using
2,000 replications) was employed to construct the 95%-confidence bands for the difference
in the low-stake and the high-stake probability weighting curves. In order to judge the
overall effect of rising stakes on the shape of the probability weighting function, we inspect
the bottom panel of Figure 3.3, depicting the confidence bands for the stake-dependent
differences in probability weights. Whenever a confidence band includes the zero line, the
hypothesis of stake-invariant probability weights cannot be rejected. The graph on the
right hand side for the gain domain, however, shows that the difference between low-gain
probability weights and high-gain probability weights is indeed statistically significant
practically over the whole range of probabilities. Therefore, we have conclusive evidence
that the high-gain probability weighting curve departs significantly and substantially from
the low-gain curve.
These findings demonstrate that probability weights are the carrier of changing risk
tolerance, and suggest that prospect theory, and for that matter many other decision
theories which postulate stake-independent probability weighting, cannot adequately deal
with risk taking choices involving major changes in stake levels.
In the domain of losses, a totally different picture emerges. The left hand side of the
top panel of Figure 3.3 depicts practically overlapping low-loss and high-loss probability
weighting curves. The high-loss curve is slightly less strongly S-shaped, which is also
reflected in the significant parameter estimate for γHIGH , amounting to 0.045 (Table 3.2).
However, this immaterial difference in the stake-dependent slope parameters does not
imply a significant difference in the overall shape of the curves: The bottom panel of
Figure 3.3 shows that the 95%-condidence band for the difference in the stake-dependent
probability weighting curves includes the zero line practically for all levels of probability.
This finding implies that, in choices framed as losses, stake effects are negligible, in line
with the lack of any stake-dependent pattern diagnosed in the observed RRP .
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Figure 3.4: Posterior Probabilities of Being an EUT Type
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So far we have only considered the evidence for the average decision maker. If there
is heterogeneity in the population, in the sense that a single preference theory cannot
adequately capture behavior, the parameter estimates of the pooled model may be mis-
leading. For this reason, the analysis is extended to account for latent heterogeneity by
estimating a finite mixture regression model.
The first question to be answered concerns the number of different types present in
the population. One way of dealing with this question is calculating a measure of entropy
for varying numbers of groups and choosing the model with the lowest entropy.
RESULT 4: There is substantive heterogeneity in individual risk preferences, which
can be captured by two distinct types of behavior. Assuming three distinct types yields an
inferior characterization of the underlying heterogeneity.
Support. The finite mixture regression model classifies individuals according to a
given number of types. In order to evaluate the quality of classification, we calculated the
Average Normalized Entropy ANE (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995) defined as
ANE = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
τic logC (τic) , (3.9)
for C groups and N individuals. Taking logC normalizes the entropy measure to lie within
[0, 1]. If all the probabilities of individual group membership τic are equal to zero or one,
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ANE = 0. In this case, all the individuals can be perfectly assigned to one group. ANE
= 1 reflects maximum entropy, i.e. all the τic are equal to 1/C. Such a result indicates
that group membership is totally ambiguous and that categorization has failed. For two
groups, we find an ANE-value of 1.8% of the maximum entropy. Given this extremely
low degree of ambiguity in our two-group classification, an improvement in entropy, when
three groups are assumed, seems hardly possible. If the classification procedure worked
better for three groups than for two groups, the average normalized entropy should be
smaller for C = 3 than for C = 2. This is clearly not the case, as ANE amounts to 3.2%
for the three-group classification. So we can safely conclude that two types of behavior
are sufficient to capture the essential characteristics of individual heterogeneity in risk
taking.
The low value of ANE in our analysis indicate that nearly all the individuals can
be unambiguously assigned to one of the two types. This clean segregation can also
be inferred from the distributions of the posterior probabilities of group assignment in
Figure 3.4: τEUT denotes the posterior probability of belonging to the first group, which
can be characterized, as we will demonstrate below, as expected utility maximizers (“EUT
types”): The individuals’ posterior probabilities of being an expected utility maximizer
are either close to one or close to zero for practically all the individuals. The histogram
also shows that the EUT group encompasses a minority of the decision makers, whereas
the other group represents a majority of close to 75% of the subjects.
The subsequent group of results addresses the focal questions: How can these two
different types be characterized? And in which way do they react to rising stake levels?
RESULT 5: The minority type, constituting about 27% of the subjects, can essentially
be characterized by expected value maximization over both low- and high-outcome ranges.
Support. There are several pieces of evidence in support of RESULT 5. Let us first turn
to Table 3.2, which also contains the parameter estimates for the finite mixture regression
model. The estimates for the minority type are displayed in the columns labeled “EUT”.
The relative group size of the minority type is estimated to be 0.266, matching the size
of the corresponding bar in the histogram of Figure 3.4.
In order to be able to characterize decisions as consistent with expected value maxi-
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mization, both the value functions and the probability weighting functions are required
to be linear. Turning to outcome valuation, we observe that α0 and β0 are not statisti-
cally distinguishable from one, as the standard errors in Table 3.2 reveal. Furthermore,
the coefficients of the high-stake dummy are insignificantly different from zero, indicating
the robustness of the value function curvatures to increasing stake size. Therefore, we
conclude that the value functions over both gains and losses are essentially linear and
unresponsive to stake size.
Linearity of the second model component, probability weighting, holds if the parameter
estimates for both γ and δ are equal to one. In Table 3.2 the low-stake parameter estimates
for δ0 are not distinguishable from one, but the respective ones for γ0 are. However,
inspection of the probability weighting curves in Figure 3.5 confirms that departures from
linear probability weighting are insubstantial. Furthermore, for both gains and losses,
no stake-size effect is visible in slope nor elevation of the probability weighting curves,
as both γHIGH and δHIGH are insignificantly different from zero, and the 95%-confidence
bands for the difference in the stake-dependent probability weighting curves include the
zero line, as confirmed by the bottom panel of Figure 3.5. These findings suggest that
the first type of decision makers behaves essentially as expected value maximizers, and
therefore consistently with EUT. These conclusions, based on the estimation results, also
bear out at the level of observed behavior. The EUT types’ median relative risk premia
in the bottom panel of Figure 3.7 are close to zero, indicating near risk neutrality for both
low stakes and high stakes.
Obviously, this first group’s, the minority’s, behavior is robust over the whole outcome
range and can, therefore, not account for increasing relative risk aversion observed in the
aggregate data. As the next result shows, the second group of individuals, constitut-
ing approximately 73% of the subjects, exhibit a completely different set of behavioral
parameter values.
RESULT 6: The majority, Non-EUT types’, behavior is characterized by nonlinear
probability weighting. Whereas value function parameters remain stable over the whole
outcome range in both decision domains, probability weights for gains do not. The low-gain
probability weighting curve is characterized by a significantly more optimistic weighting of
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Figure 3.5: Probability Weights by Stake Size of EUT Types
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Dashed lines: 95%-confidence bands based on the percentile bootstrap method.
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Figure 3.6: Probability Weights by Stake Size of Non-EUT Types
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Dashed lines: 95%-confidence bands based on the percentile bootstrap method.
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probabilities than the high-gain curve. No such effect is present in the probability weighting
curves for losses, however.
Support. The top panel of Figure 3.6 displays the stake-specific probability weighting
curves for the second group of individuals labeled “Non-EUT types”. For both gains and
losses these curves are inverted S-shaped, but there is a major domain-specific difference.
In the loss domain the stake-specific curves practically coincide, and their difference is not
statistically significant, as the left hand side of the bottom panel of Figure 3.6 confirms.
In the gain domain, however, we find the high-stake probability weighting curve to be
substantially less elevated than the low-stake one. This change is brought about by
the significant stake sensitivity of the elevation parameter over gains, reflected in the
corresponding estimate for δHIGH , which amounts to -0.344 (see the columns labeled
“Non-EUT” in Table 3.2). The high-gain probability weighting function is also slightly
less curved than the low-gain one, as γHIGH is estimated to be 0.058. The joint impact
of these parameter changes is also statistically significant, as the right hand side of the
bottom panel of Figure 3.6 shows. Therefore, we conclude that increasing relative risk
aversion over gains is mainly attributable to the Non-EUT types’ behavior who weight
high-gain probabilities significantly and substantially less optimistically than low-gain
ones. These effects can also be traced back in the pattern of observed choices: The
top panel of Figure 3.6 displays a substantial stake-dependent difference, particularly
over smaller probabilities, in the Non-EUT types’ median RRP , which is much more
pronounced than the respective difference in the pooled data shown in Figure 3.2.
The results of the finite mixture regression demonstrate that there is substantive
heterogeneity in risk taking behavior, which may be glossed over when focusing on a
single-preference model. Only one distinct group of individuals is prone to changing risk
tolerance when stakes are increased. These Non-EUT types tend to evaluate low-gain
prospects significantly more optimistically than high-gain prospects. Thus, prospect the-
ory, even though designed to explain non-EUT behavior, cannot account for this change
in relative risk aversion.
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Figure 3.7: Type-Specific Median Relative Risk Premia by Stake Size
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3.5 Conclusions
This paper pursues three goals. First, it studies the effect of substantial real gains and
losses on risk taking. Second, the paper analyzes the influence of rising stakes on the
components of lottery evaluation, i.e. on the value and probability weighting functions.
Third, it examines heterogeneity in risk taking behavior over varying stake levels. The
results of this investigation can be summarized as follows: We find a significant and
sizable increase in relative risk aversion when gains are scaled up. In the domain of losses,
however, no such clear effect is present in the data. Since subjects evaluate lotteries
differently depending on the lotteries being framed as gains or as losses, expected utility
theory is effectively ruled out as a valid description of behavior.
Contrary to previous attempts at explaining the increase in relative risk aversion
over gains by changing attitudes toward monetary payoffs, the increase can be mainly
attributed to a move of the average probability weighting function towards rational linear
weighting. As the finite mixture regression analysis shows, this average effect is brought
about by the behavior of a majority of decision makers who tend to weight probabilities
of low-stake gains considerably more optimistically than probabilities of high-stake gains.
Whereas these Non-EUT types’ behavior is sensitive to payoff levels, the minority group’s
behavior, which is shown to be largely consistent with expected value maximization, is
not.
These results pose a number of potential problems to both theoretical and applied
economics. As most theories of decision under risk typically assume separability of prob-
ability weights and outcome valuation, decision models may misrepresent risk preferences
considerably when probability weights interact with payoffs. Our results suggest that
this interaction effect is significant and substantial in the gain domain, which renders
rank-dependent models, such as prospect theory, questionable.
In the field of applied economics, one of the most important issues concerns the sub-
stantive heterogeneity found in the population. This study has demonstrated that there
are two distinct behavioral types who either weight probabilities near linearly or nonlin-
early. A similar distribution of clearly segregated types was also found in two independent
Swiss data sets (Bruhin et al., 2007) and, for choices over gains only, in a British data set
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(Conte et al., 2007), which suggests that this mix of preference types seems to be quite
robust across times and cultures. This substantive kind of heterogeneity has to be taken
into account when predicting behavior, as average parameter estimates may be quite mis-
leading. Moreover, as the literature on the role of bounded rationality under strategic
complementarity and substitutability has shown, the mix of rational and irrational actors
may be crucial for aggregate outcomes (Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985, 1989; Fehr and
Tyran, 2005). This literature demonstrates that, depending on the nature of strategic
interdependence, even a minority of players of a particular type may be decisive.
The researcher will, therefore, have to determine which one of the distinct behavioral
groups identified in the population will most likely dominate aggregate outcomes. If she
can safely conclude that the minority EUT type will dominate, stake dependence of risk
preferences is not an issue and expected value maximization may be the adequate model
of decision making. If, however, she regards the Non-EUT types as decisive for aggregate
outcomes, stake dependence might be a serious problem when gains are concerned. If
actual stakes are much larger than the ones used for model estimation, predicting behavior
on the basis of estimated model parameters might lead to a significant overestimation of
risk tolerance. In order to get a handle on choices under substantial stakes, research will
probably have to turn to field data to generate meaningful parameter estimates. Since
our results suggest that stake-sensitivity is largely due to a change in probability weights,
using more flexible specifications of utility functions, as proposed by Holt and Laury
(2002), cannot adequately solve the problem of modelling risk preferences.
The issue of stake sensitivity is an important one for choices over gains. When evalu-
ating potential losses, however, subjects seem to use different heuristics and decision rules
than when evaluating gains, which renders them rather insensitive to stake size. This
stability of behavior can be seen in both the EUT and the Non-EUT groups. While stake
dependence is not an issue here, the researcher will still have to worry about heterogeneity
and the ensuing type-dominance question. As Mason et al. (2005) have pointed out, the
common assumption of linear probability weights may lead to problematic policy recom-
mendations, if nonlinear probability weighting is the dominant pattern of behavior. The
results of this paper cast doubt on research strategies that do not take framing effects,
74
nonlinear probability weighting and the substantive heterogeneity of decision makers into
account.
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Chapter 4
Stochastic Expected Utility and
Prospect Theory in a Horse Race:
A Finite Mixture Approach
Another version of this chapter has been published as SOI Working Paper 0803.
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4.1 Introduction
Many economic decisions, especially the most important ones, such as choosing the opti-
mal career, asset allocation, or partner, involve risky consequences. Even though a sound
understanding of how individuals deal with uncertain outcomes is crucial for characteriz-
ing various markets’ outcomes there is, so far, no single best model for individual decision
making under risk. To explain the St. Petersburg Paradox, Daniel Bernoulli hypothe-
sized in 1738 that individuals maximize their expected utility, which is computed as the
sum of utilities of a lottery’s outcomes weighted by their corresponding probabilities of
realization (Bernoulli, 1954). Expected utility became a cornerstone of standard microe-
conomic theory as it applies to any regular preference relation defined over a finite number
of states (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). However, there is abundant empirical
evidence indicating that expected utility theory in its standard form is violated (Starmer,
2000). For example, individuals tend to be risk seeking for small-probability gains and
large-probability losses, whereas they are risk averse for large-probability gains and small-
probability losses. This fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992),
where individuals switch between risk averse and risk seeking behavior depending on the
outcomes’ probabilities, is incompatible with expected utility maximization. In light of
these descriptive shortcomings of expected utility theory a plethora of alternative decision
models have been developed (Starmer, 2000).
The most prominent alternative is Prospect Theory (PT) (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979), which offers a psychologically plausible account of expected utility theory viola-
tions, based on the notion of diminishing sensitivity. In PT individuals evaluate prospects
with respect to a specific reference point which defines monetary outcomes as gains or as
losses. The value functions over gains and over losses are both characterized by declining
rates of marginal value and, thus, result in a typical S-shaped curve. As certainty and
impossibility constitute obvious reference points as well, any deviations from probabili-
ties of either zero or one are perceived at a diminishing rate of sensitivity, which leads
to characteristically inversely S-shaped probability weighting functions. Such a tendency
to overweight small and underweight large probabilities, in conjunction with the sign-
dependent valuation of monetary outcomes, directly implies a fourfold pattern of risk
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attitudes. Consequently, PT and its rank-dependent extension to Cumulative Prospect
Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) turn out as some of the best fitting models for
aggregate choices (Hey and Orme, 1994; Camerer and Ho, 1994). Besides its descriptive
qualities, recent studies in neuroeconomics and evolutionary psychology indicate that PT
even seems to have a neuronal representation in the frontal regions of the brain (Trepel
et al., 2005; Camerer et al., 2005), the origins of which may be explained by optimal
foraging theory (McDermott et al., 2008). To achieve a good fit, however, parametric
models based on PT tend to require rather complex specifications and large data sets,
which makes estimation at the individual level often difficult. Moreover, PT is silent on
the determinants of the reference point for evaluating monetary outcomes.
Another problem common to all deterministic decision models, such as expected utility
theory and PT, is their inability to describe preference instability. Various studies report
subjects to reverse their preferences in roughly 25%-45% of the cases when facing the
same decisions for a second time (Camerer, 1989; Starmer and Sudgen, 1989; Wu, 1994;
Hey and Orme, 1994). Since such a behavior contradicts deterministic choice, researchers
often introduce some kind of ad-hoc stochastic error to make their models operational.
Blavatskyy (2007), on the other hand, develops a more elaborate structure for the error
term which constitutes Stochastic Expected Utility Theory’s (SEUT) key feature.
In SEUT, individuals behave as expected utility maximizers but make errors when
computing a lottery’s expected utility. By assumption, the value attributed to any given
lottery can never exceed the value of its highest payoff, nor can it fall below the value
of its lowest payoff. Since a lottery’s most extreme payoffs represent obvious bounds
for its valuation, such an assumption not only seems plausible but also is supported
by findings of Gneezy et al. (2006) who attribute observed certainty equivalents lying
outside the lottery’s range solely to errors individuals make when converting payoffs from
one denomination to another. Consequently, SEUT implies a truncated error term with
a support confined to the lottery’s range. Such a truncated error distribution, which
is generally asymmetric, directly incorporates the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, as
a lottery’s expected utility is likely to get overvalued (undervalued) when it is close to
the utility of the lowest (highest) outcome. Since the fourfold pattern in risk taking
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behavior results from the error structure, SEUT is only a descriptive model and does not
explain why empirical violations of expected utility theory come about. Nevertheless,
the model remains fairly parsimonious and, as a moderate extension of expected utility
theory, fits well into standard microeconomic theory. When comparing SEUT and PT in
various well-known data sets, Blavatskyy (2007) attests SEUT a superior performance at
describing representative choices. However, these comparisons ignore potential individual
heterogeneity and are based on fairly homogeneous subject pools which all stem from
developed Western countries.
Furthermore, there is vast heterogeneity in individual risk taking behavior (Hey and
Orme, 1994) rendering purely representative agent approaches questionable, especially
when markets are imperfect and there is risk of aggregation bias (Fehr and Tyran, 2005).
With the advent of finite mixture models in the field (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; El-Gamal
and Grether, 1995; Houser et al., 2004), experimental economists are now equipped with
a convenient econometric tool to deal with latent individual heterogeneity in a parsimo-
nious way. These models allow identifying and characterizing different behavioral types
in the population and provide an endogenous individual classification into these types.
Independent studies by Conte et al. (2007) and Bruhin et al. (2007) apply finite mixture
specifications to a total of four different experimental data sets on risk taking behavior
and find roughly 20% of the participants to behave essentially risk neutrally, whereas
the majority of about 80% of the participants clearly exhibit the fourfold pattern of risk
attitudes.
For two quite diverse populations, this study first examines PT’s and SEUT’s perfor-
mance in fitting aggregate choices. It uses data from two different experiments which were
conducted in Zurich, Switzerland as well as in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. In
both experiments, which have the same basic design in common, the certainty equivalents
of a large number of binary lotteries, framed either as gains or losses, are elicited for a
total of 271 participants. In contrast to Blavatskyy (2007), the results on the aggregate
level are mixed since, depending on the data set, either PT or SEUT superiorly describe
a representative agent’s choices. In fact, an inspection of the individual mean squared
errors reveals that SEUT provides a superior fit compared to PT for only roughly one
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third of the participants in both data sets. Such stable shares call representative agent
approaches into question and suggest a mix of theories, as applied in the second part of
the analysis.
To control for individual heterogeneity, a finite mixture model estimates the behavioral
parameters of two types, one PT the other SEUT, while it endogenously determines which
one of the two theories best describes a specific subject’s choices. In both data sets the
resulting individual classifications are remarkably clean and robust: With low measures of
entropy, about 25% of the subjects are assigned to the SEUT group whereas PT delivers
a superior fit for about 75% of the subjects. Moreover, the subjects identified as SEUT
types value outcomes linearly and, with only a few exceptions, coincide with the subjects
reported to behave risk neutrally by Bruhin et al. (2007), i.e. subjects identified as
expected utility types. The participants assigned to the other group seem to distort
probabilities by a pattern which is best explained by PT, rather than SEUT.
Thus, previous results on individual heterogeneity that, on average, about one forth of
the population seems to behave almost risk neutrally, whereas the majority shows a pro-
nounced fourfold pattern in risk taking behavior are confirmed. Furthermore, even when
SEUT fits into general microeconomic theory and describes aggregate choices quite well
but not without exceptions, the rigid patterns it imposes on deviations from expected util-
ity seems to prevent it from outperforming PT in a finite mixture context. Consequently,
as soon as individual heterogeneity is taken into account, SEUT neither outperforms PT
nor does it deliver any additional qualitative insights.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the experimental setup and
the procedure applied to elicit the certainty equivalents. Section 4.3 explains the two
theories’ formulations as econometric models for representative choice before it introduces
the finite mixture specification. Some estimation issues typical to finite mixture models
are also briefly addressed in this part. In section 4.4 the results of the representative
choice models as well as the finite mixture model are interpreted. Finally, 4.5 sums up
and concludes.
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Table 4.1: Differences in Experimental Design
Zurich 06 Beijing 05
Number of:
Subjects 118 153
Lotteries 40 28
Observations 4,669 4,281
Procedure computerized paper and pencil
4.2 Experimental Design
The study uses experimental data from Bruhin et al. (2007). The experiments were
conducted in Zurich 2006 and in Beijing 2005. The participants for the Zurich experiment
were randomly selected from the subject pool of the Institute for Empirical Research in
Economics consisting of students from various fields of the University of Zurich and the
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. The Chinese subjects were recruited by flier
among the students of Peking University and Tsinhua University. As both experiments
have the same basic design in common, this section presents the Zurich experiment in
detail and discusses in which respects the experimental design in Beijing 2005 deviates.
Table 4.1 summarizes the most important differences between the two experiments.
The experiments both aimed at eliciting participants’ certainty equivalents for 28 to
40 two-outcome lotteries. One half of the lotteries were framed as choices between risky
and certain gains (“gain domain”), the other half as options between risky and certain
losses (“loss domain”). For each lottery in the loss domain the participants received an
initial monetary endowment to cover their potential losses.
The certainty equivalents were elicited by applying the following choice menu (Kahne-
man et al., 1991): For any given lottery under consideration the decision sheet contained
two options, the lottery and a certain outcome which varied in 20 equal steps from the
lottery’s maximum payoff to the lottery’s minimum payoff, as shown in Figure 4.1. For
each row the subjects had to reveal whether they prefer the lottery or the actual cer-
tain payoff. The certainty equivalent was calculated as the arithmetic mean between the
smallest certain amount preferred to the lottery and the subsequent certain amount, were
the lottery was first chosen. In the example depicted in Figure 4.1 the subject’s choices
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Figure 4.1: Design of the Decision Sheet
Decision situation:
22
Guaranteed payoff amounting to:
1 A o B
2 A o B
3 A o B
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5 A o B
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7 A o B
8 A o B
9 A o B
10 A o B
11 A o B
12 A o B
13 A o B
14 A o B
15 A o B
16 A o B
17 A o B
18 A o B
19 A o B
20 A o B 1
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14
13
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20
19
Option B
7
6
5
4
3
2
Option A Your Choice:
A profit of CHF 20 with 
probability 75%             
and a profit of CHF 0 with 
probability 25% 
11
10
9
8
18
17
16
28
are indicated by the small circles implying a certainty equivalent of 13.5 Swiss Francs.1
The experiment conducted in Zurich used a computerized procedure programmed in the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) whereas in Beijing the decision sheets were printed
out on paper. In both experiments the lotteries appeared in random order.
Payoffs per subject averaged out at approximately 31 Swiss Francs and 20 Chinese
Yuan, considerably more than a local student assistant’s hourly compensation, plus a
show up fee of 10 Swiss Francs and 20 Chinese Yuan, respectively, thus generating salient
incentives2. In Zurich the lotteries’ outcomes, x1 and x2, varied between zero to 150 Swiss
francs. The payoffs in the Beijing 2005 experiment were comparable in terms of typical
local stundent’s compensation and ranged from zero to 55 Chinese Yuan. Probabilities p
of the lotteries’ higher gain or loss x1 varied between 5% and 95%. Table 4.2 shows the
two experiments’ lotteries in the gain domain.
After reading the instructions, the subjects had to correctly calculate the payoffs for
1One Swiss Franc equals about one U.S. dollars.
2One Chinese Yuan equals about 0.14 U.S. dollars.
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Table 4.2: Gain Lotteries (x1, p;x2)
Zurich 06 Beijing 05
p x1 x2 p x1 x2 p x1 x2 p x1 x2
0.05 40 0 0.50 20 0 0.05 15 4 0.75 20 7
0.05 40 10 0.50 20 10 0.05 20 7 0.90 7 4
0.05 50 20 0.50 40 10 0.05 55 20 0.95 15 4
0.05 150 50 0.50 50 20 0.10 7 4 0.95 20 7
0.10 20 10 0.75 40 10 0.25 15 4
0.10 150 0 0.75 50 20 0.25 20 7
0.25 40 0 0.90 20 10 0.50 7 4
0.25 40 10 0.95 40 10 0.50 15 4
0.25 50 20 0.95 50 0 0.50 20 7
0.50 10 0 0.95 50 20 0.75 15 4
Outcomes are denominated in Swiss Francs (Zurich 2006) and Chinese Yuan
(Beijing 2005), respectively.
two hypothetical choices before they were permitted to start working on the experimental
decisions.3 In the computerized experiments, there were two trial rounds to familiarize
the subjects with the procedure. At the end of the experiment, one row number of one
decision sheet was randomly selected for each subject, and the subject’s choice in that
row determined her payment. The subjects were paid in private afterward. They could
work at their own speed, the vast majority of them needed less than an hour to complete
the experiment.
4.3 Econometric Models
This section covers the econometric models’ formulation and some associated estimation
issues. The first two models for fitting aggregate choices are based on a single decision
model, SEUT or PT, respectively. The third specification, a finite mixture model, com-
bines these two approaches by simultaneously estimating the behavioral parameters of a
group of SEUT as well as PT types. As such a model endogenously determines which of
the two decision models best describes a specific subject’s choices, it provides an estimate
of their respective shares among the population. This procedure yields a basis for decid-
ing whether to take potential heterogeneity into account or to assume a representative
3The instructions are available on request.
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decision maker.
4.3.1 Prospect Theory for Representative Choice
In PT a subject i ∈ {1, . . . , N} values any given lottery Gg = (x1g, pg;x2g), g ∈ {1, . . . , G},
where |x1g| > |x2g|, by
v (Gg) = v (x1g)w (pg) + v (x2g) (1− w (pg)) . (4.1)
The sign-dependent function v(x) denotes how monetary outcomes, x, are valued, whereas
w(p) assigns a subjective weight to every outcome probability, p. The gamble’s certainty
equivalent cˆeg can be written as
cˆeg = v
−1 [v (x1g)w (pg) + v (x2g) (1− w (pg))] . (4.2)
To make the model operational both the value function, v(x), and the probability
weights, w(p), need to be specified by assuming a functional form. A natural candidate
for v(x) is a sign-dependent power function
v(x) =
 xα if x ≥ 0−(−x)β otherwise, (4.3)
which has a convenient interpretation and turned out to be the best compromise be-
tween parsimony and goodness of fit in the context of PT (Stott, 2006). The probability
weighting curve, w(p), is modeled as two-parameter function as proposed by Goldstein
and Einhorn (1987) and Lattimore et al. (1992):
w(p) =
δpγ
δpγ + (1− p)γ , δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0. (4.4)
This specification has not only proven to account well for individual heterogeneity (Wu
et al., 2004) but also its parameters have a neat interpretation: The parameter γ largely
governs the slope of the curve, whereas the parameter δ largely governs its elevation.
The smaller the value of γ, the more strongly the probability weighting function deviates
from linear weighting. The larger the value of δ, the more elevated the curve, ceteris
paribus. Linear weighting is characterized by γ = δ = 1. In a sign-dependent model, the
parameters may take on different values for gains and for losses.
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As PT explains deterministic choice a stochastic error term needs to be assumed in
order to estimate the model’s parameters based on the elicited certainty equivalents, ceig.
There could be many different sources of error, such as carelessness, hurry or inattentive-
ness, resulting in wrong answers. Thus, as suggested by Hey and Orme (1994), the model
assumes an additive Fechner-type error (ig, such that ceig = cˆeg + (ig. The Central Limit
Theorem indicates that the errors are normally distributed and simply add white noise.
Furthermore, the model has to account for heteroskedasticity in the error variance. For
each lottery the subjects have to consider 20 certain outcomes, which are equally spaced
throughout the lottery’s range |x1g − x2g|. Since the observed certainty equivalents ceig
are calculated as the arithmetic mean of the smallest certain amount preferred to the
lottery and the subsequent certain amount the measurement error in the model’s depen-
dent variable is proportional to the lottery range. This yields the form σg = σ|x1g − x2g|
for the standard deviation of the error term distribution, where σ denotes an additional
parameter to be estimated.
Given these assumptions on the distribution of the error term, the individual contri-
bution to the model’s likelihood can be expressed as
f (cei,G; θ) =
G∏
g=1
1
σg
φ
(
ceig − cˆeg
σg
)
, (4.5)
where φ denotes the density of the standard normal distribution. The vector of parame-
ters, θ = (α, β, γ′, δ′,σ)′ is estimated by maximizing the model’s likelihood given by the
product of (4.5) over all individuals.
4.3.2 Stochastic Expected Utility Theory for Representative
Choice
In the standard microeconomic model with deterministic preferences a given lottery Gg is
valued by its expected utility, which implies the following certainty equivalent
cˆeg = u
−1 [u (x1g) pg + u (x2g) (1− pg)] , (4.6)
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where u(x) represents a subjective utility function. A convenient parametric specification
in terms of interpretability and parsimony is, again, a power function
u(x) =
 xη if x ≥ 0−(−x)η otherwise, , (4.7)
where η measures u(x)’s curvature.
As a purely descriptive theory, SEUT does not aim at explaining the fundamentals
underlying such robust phenomena as the fourfold pattern. Hence, subjects do not explic-
itly distort probabilities, but they are allowed to make random errors when computing
the expected utility of a risky lottery. However, as the lottery’s most extreme payoffs rep-
resent obvious bounds, SEUT assumes that a lottery’s value cannot exceed the value of
its highest outcome nor can it fall below the value of its lowest outcome. Thus, instead of
applying the standard Fechner model with symmetric and unbounded errors, Blavatskyy
(2007) suggests truncating the error term, ωig, at x1g − cˆeg and at x2g − cˆeg, so that the
certainty equivalent ceig = cˆeg + ωig is limited to lie within the lottery’s range, x1g and
x2g. As Figure 4.2 illustrates, ceig can only be symmetrically distributed if p = 0.5, and
is the more asymmetrically distributed the more p differs from 0.5. Consequently, for
p %= 0.5, the expected error E(ωig) %= 0, and ceig deviates from cˆeg with a higher proba-
bility towards the lottery’s center than towards its bounds. So in the gain (loss) domain
for p < 0.5, the realized certainty equivalent, ceig, tends to be larger (smaller) than the
value predicted by expected utility theory, cˆeg. A decision maker behaving according to
SEUT, therefore, still exhibits a specific fourfold pattern in her choices which is driven by
stochastic errors, even if she weights probabilities completely linearly.
Analogous to the assumed structure in the PT model, ωig has a (truncated) normal
distribution and is affected by the same source of heteroskedasticity, i.e., its standard
deviation is denoted by ξg = ξ |x1g − x2g|, with an unknown parameter ξ. Under these
assumptions, the individual contribution to the model’s likelihood can be written as
h (cei,G;ψ) =
G∏
g=1
1
ξg
φ
(
ceig−cˆeg
ξg
)
∣∣∣Φ(x1−cˆegξg )− Φ(x2−cˆegξg )∣∣∣ , (4.8)
where Φ denotes the standard normal’s cumulative distribution function. Taking the
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of ceig under SEUT (pg = 0.2, ξ = 0.4|x1g − x2g|, η = 1)
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product over all individuals and maximizing the resulting likelihood function yields the
maximum likelihood estimates of the model’s parameters ψ = (η, ξ)′.
4.3.3 Finite Mixture Model to Control for Heterogeneity
Since there is evidence for individual heterogeneity in risk taking behavior (Hey and Orme,
1994), aggregating the data and estimating one single decision model veils potentially
important behavioral differences and may deliver misleading results. However, estimating
all decision models under consideration for each participant separately is highly inefficient
and is often rendered impossible by the limited amount of data available per individual.
Furthermore, to draw meaningful conclusions, the subjects would still need to be classified
by some method into different groups, based on their estimated behavioral parameters.
Thus, instead of operating at the individual level, the finite mixture model proposed
here relaxes the assumption of one single representative decision maker by introducing
two behavioral types, one PT the other SEUT. A priori an individual i’s group member-
ship is unknown. Hence, her contribution to the model’s likelihood consists of the two
decision models’ individual likelihoods, (4.5) and (4.8), weighted by the probability that
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she belongs to the respective type:
, (Ψ; cei,G) = piSEUT h (cei,G;ψ) + (1− piSEUT ) f (cei,G; θ) , (4.9)
where the vectorΨ = (η,α, β, γ′, δ′, ξ,σ, piSEUT )
′ contains all the model’s parameters. Note
that the probability of being drawn from the SEUT group, piSEUT , equals the fraction of
SEUT types among the population and needs to be estimated too. After taking logs, the
product over all individuals of (4.9) represents the finite mixture model’s log likelihood
lnL (Ψ; ce,G) =
N∑
i=1
ln [piSEUT h (cei,G;ψ) + (1− piSEUT ) f (cei,G; θ)] . (4.10)
As any finite mixture model’s likelihood, (4.10) is highly nonlinear even after taking
logs and the log likelihood still contains products, piSEUT , cannot be estimated separately
from the two types’ average parameters, ψ and θ, respectively. Moreover, (4.10) may
be multimodal and unbounded (for more details see McLachlan and Peel (2000) and
Render and Walker (1984)), which renders direct maximum likelihood estimation difficult.
In order to cope with these problems effectively, the estimation routine, programmed
in the R environment (R Development Core Team, 2006), first applies the Expectation
Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977) before it switches to the much
faster BFGS algorithm.4 The EM algorithm iteratively proceeds in two steps, E and M.
During the E-step, an individual a posteriori probability of belonging to the SEUT-group,
τi,SEUT , is computed given the actual fit of the data, Ψˆ:
τi,SEUT =
pˆiSEUT h
(
cei,G; ψˆ
)
pˆiSEUT h
(
cei,G; ψˆ
)
+ (1− pˆiSEUT ) f
(
cei,G; θˆ
) (4.11)
In the following M-step, the model’s so called complete data log likelihood is maximized,
where τi,SEUT replaces unobserved individual group membership. This yields an analyt-
ical expression for the relative group size’s update, pˆiSEUT = 1/N
∑N
i=1 τi,SEUT , which
is computed separately from the model’s remaining parameter updates: θˆ and ψˆ. Fur-
thermore, after convergence is achieved, the individual probabilities, τi,SEUT , obtained at
4The Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm is a Quasi-Newton method which allows
solving unconstrained non-linear optimization problems (see for example Broyden (1970)). It is one of the
standard hill-climbing optimization routines implemented in the R environment as well as other statistical
packages such as STATA.
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the maximum likelihood estimate, not only provide a way of endogenously assigning the
subjects to either of the two types, but also, they allow to assess how well the two groups
are segregated. A clean segregation reflects good performance at capturing individual
heterogeneity, whereas relatively high levels of ambiguity in individual group assignment
may indicate overfitting, lack of identification, or misspecification.
4.4 Results
The first part of this section discusses the fourfold pattern in risk taking behavior which
is found in both data sets. As both theories, PT and SEUT, are able to describe this
pattern their goodness of fit for aggregate choices is assessed in a second part. The last
part accounts for potential heterogeneity and interprets the finite mixture regressions by
inspecting the two type’s relative sizes and behavioral parameters, as well as by assesssing
the ambiguity in individual group assignment.
The data of both experiments clearly exhibit the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes,
which violates expected utility theory. In Figure 4.3, the bars represent the median value
of the observed relative risk premia, RRP = (ev− ce)/|ev|, where ev denotes the lottery’s
expected value, sorted by the probability p that the most extreme payoff is realized. Thus,
people are risk averse (RRP > 0) for small-probability losses and large-probability gains,
whereas they are risk seeking (RRP < 0) for large-probability losses and small-probability
gains.
4.4.1 Representative Choice
For both data sets, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the maximum likelihood estimates of the
representative PT and SEUT models, respectively. The standard errors, in parentheses,
are based on the bootstrap method with 2,000 replications (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).
In the case of PT, as depicted in Table 4.3, the estimated α and β are both close to
unity for the Swiss subjects indicating an almost linear value function. Hence, for gains
as well as for losses, the Swiss participants’ observed risk attitudes are mostly driven
by nonlinear probability weighting: With γ smaller than one and δ close to unity, the
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Figure 4.3: Observed Median Relative Risk Premia by p
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Table 4.3: Prospect Theory Regressions
Parameter Estimates Zurich 06 Beijing 05
Gain Domain
α 0.910 0.451
(0.025) (0.115)
γ 0.455 0.293
(0.010) (0.009)
δ 0.867 1.316
(0.022) (0.083)
Loss Domain
β 1.123 1.202
(0.045) (0.127)
γ 0.490 0.352
(0.010) (0.009)
δ 1.040 0.887
(0.037) (0.163)
σ 0.146 0.163
(0.002) (0.002)
lnL 10,089 9,149
BIC -20,119 -18,239
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap
method with 2,000 replications.
estimated probability weighting curve is inversely S-shaped as typically found in other
studies (Stott, 2006; Wu et al., 2004). The Chinese people, on the other hand, value
monetary gains at a declining rate of marginal utility (α = 0.451), while they weight
probabilities much more optimistically than their Swiss colleagues. The smaller value of
γ = 0.293 makes them less sensitive to changes in probabilities, whereas the larger δ =
1.316 corresponds to a generally more elevated probability weighting function. For losses,
however, there is no substantial cultural difference, as in both data sets the participants’
value functions are only slightly curved and the probability weights are clearly inversely
S-shaped. The estimates of σ correspond to an average standard deviation of the error
term lying between 14.6% and 16.3% of the lotteries’ ranges.
The results for SEUT, on the other hand, are depicted in Table 4.4. The model’s
only behavioral parameter, η, is estimated to lie in the vicinity of one which implies an
almost linear utility function for the Swiss as well as the Chinese subjects. In SEUT,
deviations from expected utility theory are directly related to the model’s asymmetric
error structure. So, the pronounced fourfold pattern observed in the data immediately
96
Table 4.4: Stochastic Expected Utility Regressions
Parameter Estimate Zurich 06 Beijing 05
η 0.952 0.947
(0.016) (0.059)
ξ 0.211 0.283
(0.004) (0.004)
lnL 10,094 8,796
BIC -20,171 -17,576
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap
method with 2,000 replications.
translates into relatively high estimates for the error’s standard deviation, ξ.
Regardless of its more rigid specification, which requires five parameters fewer than
PT, SEUT achieves a better fit to the Zurich data even in terms of log likelihood. This
is in line with recent findings by Blavatskyy (2007) who reports a good fit of SEUT to
several data sets on aggregate choices from different Western countries. In the Beijing data
set, however, PT performs better, even when being judged by the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC), which penalizes its less parsimonious specification (BICPT = −18, 239
vs. BICSEUT = −17, 576). As mentioned before and indicated by the estimates in Table
4.3, the Chinese subjects judge risky prospects asymmetrically between the gain and loss
domain, which cannot be fitted by the model based on SEUT. This may explain SEUT’s
inferior performance for the Chinese data.
Moreover, since these mixed results on the aggregate level may reflect individual het-
erogeneity, I assess the models’ goodness of fit based on the individual mean squared
errors in relative risk premia over all lotteries, MSEi = 1/G
∑G
g=1
(
R̂RP g −RRPig
)2
,
which increases in the differences between the predicted R̂RP g and the observed RRPig
relative risk premia. Comparing the MSEi between PT and SEUT indeed reveals some
individual heterogeneity in the data: In Zurich and Beijing the share of participants for
which SEUT performs better, i.e. delivers smaller MSEi than PT, amounts to 38% and
36%, respectively. Even though the relative overall performance of SEUT seems to be
superior for the Swiss and inferior for the Chinese data, the fraction of people for which
it leads to smaller MSEi is robust. By requiring only two parameters to be estimated
SEUT is very parsimonious, but the other side of the coin is that the pattern of devi-
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Table 4.5: Finite Mixture Regressions
Parameter Estimates Zurich 06 Beijing 05
Share of SEUT Types: piSEUT 0.288 0.223
(0.096) (0.030)
η 0.974 0.974
(0.018) (0.056)
ξ 0.112 0.127
(0.059) (0.070)
Share of PT Types: 1− piSEUT 0.712 0.777
(0.096) (0.030)
Gain Domain
α 0.902 0.377
(0.035) (0.132)
γ 0.372 0.212
(0.027) (0.013)
δ 0.843 1.371
(0.033) (0.099)
Loss Domain
β 1.167 1.197
(0.075) (0.147)
γ 0.398 0.272
(0.028) (0.013)
δ 1.029 0.885
(0.059) (0.070)
σ 0.151 0.160
(0.033) (0.099)
lnL 10,603 9,636
BIC -21,122 -19,188
ANE 0.048 0.007
Number of Observations 4,669 4,281
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap
method with 2,000 replications.
ations from expected utility theory is rigidly determined by the shape of the truncated
normal distribution and its standard deviation (see Figure 4.2 for an illustration). So,
its overall performance may react quite sensitively to outliers, domain-specific behavioral
asymmetry and the overall composition of the data sets.
4.4.2 Finite Mixture Model
The fact that in both data sets PT and SEUT seem to superiorly fit the subjects’ choices
by a ratio of about 6:4, suggests using a mix of both theories rather than estimating
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just one single decision model. Indeed, the BIC reported in Table 4.5 consistently at-
tributes a better performance to the finite mixture regressions than to either of the two
representative choice models. Examining the posterior probabilities of individual group
membership, τi,SEUT , allows to assess how well the individual heterogeneity is captured
by the assumption of two behavioral types. If the subjects are cleanly segregated all the
τi,SEUT are either close to zero, indicating members of the PT group, or are close to one,
indicating members of the SEUT group. The histograms in Figure 4.4 show the distri-
bution of these probabilities of individual group membership for the two estimated finite
mixture regressions. By exhibiting only two prominent spikes, one close to τi,SEUT = 0
the other close to τi,SEUT = 1, the histograms reveal graphically that individual group
assignment is very clean in both data sets. Another way of assessing the quality of indi-
vidual group assignment is to look at some measure of entropy which maps the ambiguity
in τi,SEUT into a single number. For example, the Average Normalized Entropy (El-Gamal
and Grether, 1995) defined as
ANE = −1/N
N∑
i=1
τi,SEUT log2 (τi,SEUT ) + (1− τi,SEUT ) log2 (1− τi,SEUT ) (4.12)
is normalized to lie within [0, 1]. In the case of perfect individual group assignment all
τi,SEUT equal zero or one, implying ANE = 0. ANE = 1, on the other hand, reflects
complete ambiguity, i.e. all the τi,SEUT = 0.5, and a failure of classification. Table 4.5
reveals that the ANE only amounts to 0.7% and 4.8% of its maximum value, respectively.
These low numbers of entropy, again, reflect the remarkably good performance of the
finite mixture model in dealing with individual heterogeneity by cleanly classifying each
subject either as a SEUT or a PT type. So, while staying fairly parsimonious the finite
mixture model consistently achieves a lower BIC and maps individual heterogeneity very
well. Hence for purely statistical reasons, it may be preferred over a representative agent
approach.
Whether the individual classification into a SEUT and PT group also bears economic
meaning can be assessed on the basis of the corresponding behavioral parameters, ψ and
θ, and the mixing proportion, piSEUT . And indeed, by looking at the estimates shown in
Table 4.5, a consistent picture emerges:
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Figure 4.4: Probability Distribution of Individual Group Membership
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The SEUT types are estimated to constitute 28.8% and 22.3% of the population,
respectively. Their underlying utility function u(x) is, on average, almost linear with
an estimated η = 0.974. In contrast to the SEUT model for representative choice, the
estimates of the error’s standard deviation, ξ, amount to only 11.2% and 12.7% of the
lotteries’ ranges. The deviations from standard expected utility theory are therefore
much less pronounced than in the aggregate model. In conjunction with the nearly linear
utility function, this implies a behavior much closer to risk neutrality than predicted by
the previously discussed SEUT model for representative choice.
To separate the two groups, each subject i in the sample is labeled either as PT type
(τi,SEUT < 0.5) or as SEUT type (τi,SEUT ≥ 0.5) after the estimation of the finite mixture
model. After such a separation by type, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the median observed
relative risk premia sorted by p for the Swiss and Chinese data, respectively. The observed
relative risk premia of the participants classified as SEUT types are indeed close to zero
over p’s entire range, which reflects an almost risk neutral behavior, as illustrated in the
lower panels of Figures 4.5 and 4.6. Furthermore, according to Bruhin et al. (2007), the
shares of nearly risk neutral participants amount to 22.4% in Zurich 2006 and 20.1% in
Beijing 2005 when a mixture model of two different PT types is estimated, instead of
assuming one SEUT and one PT type. With the exception of only 8 and 3 subjects,
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Figure 4.5: Observed Median Relative Risk Premia by p and Type (Zurich 2006)
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Figure 4.6: Observed Median Relative Risk Premia by p and Type (Beijing 2005)
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respectively, the individual classifications found here coincide with the ones reported by
Bruhin et al. (2007). So, assuming two behavioral types, one SEUT and the other PT,
reproduces previous findings by Conte et al. (2007) and Bruhin et al. (2007) that about
one fourth of the individuals can, on average, essentially be characterized as expected
value maximizers.
Given the observed relative risk premia as shown in Figure 4.3, it comes at no surprise
that the majority of participants, labeled as PT types, exhibit a pronounced fourfold
pattern of risk attitudes, as depicted in the upper panels in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. In
Zurich as well as Beijing the PT types are estimated to consitute 71.2% and 77.7% of the
population, respectively. Their behavioral parameters are qualitatively equivalent to the
ones estimated in the PT model for representative choice: The Swiss value functions are
only slightly curved (α = 0.902, β = 1.167) whereas, at least for gains, Chinese marginal
valuation changes at a steeper rate (α = 0.377). Analogous to the case of representative
choice, the estimates of γ and δ translate into a probability weighting function exhibiting
the characteristic inverse S-shape. And again, when considering small-probability gains,
the Chinese participants seem to be more optimistic, as their probability weights are more
elevated (δ = 1.316) and less sensitive to changes in p (γ = 0.293).
Thus, estimating a finite mixture model to account for individual heterogeneity instead
of modeling representative choice does not only lead to a better fit to the data but also
consistently identifies two distinct behavioral types with a neat economic interpretation:
A minority of about 25% behave in an almost risk neutral way, and a majority of about
75% exhibit strong probability distortions best described by a sign-dependent model such
as PT. Even though being well suited for describing representative choice, in a finite
mixture context SEUT does neither deliver any additional insights nor does it simplify
the model’s interpretation. In spite of the mixed results for aggregate choice, SEUT
is a tempting option if the researcher wants to mildly extend standard microeconomic
theory and to parsimoniously model a representative agent’s choices. But if markets are
imperfect and exhibit strategic complementarity, she wants to avoid aggregation bias and
take individual heterogeneity into account (Fehr and Tyran, 2005) and, therefore, may
opt for a finite mixture specification where SEUT offers barely any advantages over PT.
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4.5 Conclusion
This study compared PT’s and SEUT’s performance at describing individual decision
making under risk in two experimental data sets, one Swiss the other Chinese. On the ag-
gregate level the results are mixed: In conformity with the findings reported by Blavatskyy
(2007) for various data sets from other Western countries SEUT clearly outperforms PT
in the Swiss data set. In China, however, subjects weight probabilities for gains on av-
erage more optimistically and exhibit stronger curvature in their value function. Since
SEUT imposes a rigid pattern for deviations from expected utility maximization and can-
not cope with behavioral asymmetries between gains and losses, it fits the Chinese data
inferiorly when being compared to a more flexible sign-dependent specification such as
PT. Furthermore, the finding that both PT and SEUT superiorly describe the choices of
a consistent fraction of subjects each calls a representative agent approach into question.
Indeed, the finite mixture regressions, which control for individual heterogeneity by
assuming a mix of PT and SEUT types, reveal a coherent picture: In both data sets the
mixture model cleanly segregates the subjects into an SEUT and a PT group. Roughly
25% of the individuals are identified as SEUT types and behave essentially risk neutrally,
whereas the choices of the remaining 75% are best described by PT. Recent studies es-
timating finite mixture models based on PT and expected utility theory only report a
segregation into two behaviorally similar types (Conte et al., 2007; Bruhin et al., 2007).
Moreover, the individual classification found in this study by and large coincides with the
one reported in Bruhin et al. (2007). This supports the notion that about one fourth of
the subjects can be characterized basically as expected value maximizers.
Despite its parsimony SEUT shows good descriptive power when fitting aggregate
choices and, as a modest extension to expected utility theory, molds well into standard
microeconomic theory. However, as soon as the often unrealistic assumption of one single
representative agent is relaxed, its rigidity causes SEUT to fall short of PT’s performance
in describing decision making under risk for the majority group of subjects violating
expected utility theory. Consequently, its parsimony may make SEUT an elegant option
to model aggregate outcomes on perfect markets, but when individual heterogeneity has
to be taken into account a flexible sign-dependent specification based on PT is the superior
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choice.
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Chapter 5
Happiness Functions with Preference
Interdependence and Heterogeneity:
The Case of Altruism within the
Family
This chapter is joint work with Rainer Winkelmann.
Another version of this chapter has been published as SOI Working Paper 0702 and is
forthcoming in the Journal of Population Economics.
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5.1 Introduction
Happiness data are increasingly used to tackle important problems in economics, as re-
viewed by Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005), or Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006).
Indeed, the recent surge in interest is quite dramatic, as pointed out by Clark et al.
(2006), who counted 417 happiness-related articles in Econlit between 1960 and 2005,
76% of which had been published since 1995 and 30% since 2003. Most of these papers
use, in one way or another, responses to current happiness or life satisfaction questions
in cross-section and panel survey data to study the factors motivating individual behav-
ior, as well as the effects of behavior, policies and institutions, on well-being. With the
odd exception, much of the previous literature takes a purely individualistic approach to
happiness.
The aim of this study is to broaden the existing literature by focusing on positive
preference interdependence as in Becker (1981), which may result in altruistic behavior.
The question how widely and to what extent altruistic preferences are present in the
population is important in various fields of economics. In public economics, the presence
of altruism in a substantial fraction of the population may, by adjusting charitable giving
and other voluntary transfers, neutralize governmental attempts at redistributing income
between generations (Laferrere and Wolff, 2006). In macroeconomic growth modeling, it
is crucial to distinguish between two different motivations for intergenerational transfer
payments, altruism or joy of giving (Barro, 1974; Bertola et al., 2006). With altruism,
individuals’ preferences exhibit positive interdependence so that their current utility levels
correspond to the discounted utility flows of all future generations, which results in an
infinite planning horizon. Individuals motivated solely by joy of giving, however, do
not care about the utility of their offspring and, consequently, their bequests will be
driven solely by the utility obtained from donating per se. This supports an overlapping
generations point of view instead of an infinite planning horizon. Moreover, as Fehr
and Fischbacher (2002) point out, when markets are imperfect even a minority of people
exhibiting some sort of social preferences, such as altruism, can have a major impact on
the equilibrium.
In contrast to other studies on altruism, which rely on the analysis of consumption
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levels and transfers, we focus on subjective well-being as an immediate indicator of utility.
Besides being straightforward, this approach allows us to identify altruistic preferences
even in a case where the income gap between parents and their children is not wide enough
to trigger transfer payments. Imagine a situation where the parents’ and their children’s
marginal utility of income are almost the same. In such a case the parents’ marginal
disutility of reduced consumption associated with a transfer payment is likely to exceed
the marginal utility gained from a transfer induced increase in the children’s happiness.
So, even if these parents have altruistic preferences in the sense that they care for their
children’s happiness, this is not revealed in transfer or consumption patterns. However,
by directly analyzing the dependence of the parents’ utility on their children’s subjective
well-being our approach allows us to still detect altruistic preferences even in the absence
of any transfer payments.
Our analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),
a representative annual panel survey initiated in 1984. As the panel population ages,
children become adults, move out of their parental homes and set up their own households.
The GSOEP has the nice feature that it surveys these descendants’ households as well,
and thus allows us to generate linked parent-child observations. Between 2000 and 2004,
we observe a total of 2,577 interviewed parents with at least one child living in a spin-off
household. As these parents are observed in several waves of the panel, and some of them
have more than just one adult child who has left home, the number of linkable parent-child
pairs amounts to 11,330. Each of these pairs is observed on average for slightly more than
3 years.
Winkelmann (2005), using GSOEP data as well but a different sample including chil-
dren still at home, reports a long-run correlation of 0.4 to 0.5 in subjective well-being
between parents and children. In principle, there are at least three different explana-
tions for this finding: First, attitudes towards well-being may be genetically transmitted.
Second, parents and children may share, to some extent, the same environmental and
socio-economic attributes. Third, the correlation may be due to a direct, positive, and
causal dependence of the parents’ utility functions on the utility of their adult children,
i.e. altruism. In order to isolate the latter effect, we suggest an estimation strategy based
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on panel data.
We know from experimental economic research that there exist several distinct social
preference types, and at least a minority of people seem to exhibit altruistic preferences
(see for example Fehr and Schmidt (2002)). Besides reporting vast heterogeneity, An-
dreoni and Miller (2002), for example, find evidence based on a series of Dictator Games
that about 23% of their participants treat their own and the other’s payoffs as perfect
substitutes, a behavior compatible with altruism. Phelps (2001) conducts Thematic Ap-
perception Tests, a battery of psychological tests aimed at identifying altruistic motiva-
tion, and finds that around 20% of the participants responded in an altruistic manner.
We will compare our estimates of the prevalence of altruistic preferences, based on survey
data, with these findings, gained by applying completely different methodologies in other
fields of economic and psychological research.
By estimating a finite mixture regression model we account for unobserved hetero-
geneity, i.e. the existence of different social preference types, and isolate the share of
altruists in a representative household sample. Distinguishing between two preference
types allows us to separate the fraction of altruistic parents from the remainder of the
sample, which is assumed to behave selfishly.1 As the finite mixture model endogenously
assigns a group membership (altruistic/selfish) probability to each parent, we can test
on an individual level how altruism corresponds to transfer payments. This allows us
to check the plausibility of the endogenous group assignment, as we expect parents with
altruistic preferences to pay - at least on average - higher transfers towards their children.
In Section 5.2 the structure of the data set is discussed in greater detail, and descriptive
statistics are provided. Section 5.3 covers the basic econometric model, an extensions to
account for household-specific effects, and estimation. Section 5.4 presents and interprets
the results, while Section 5.5 concludes.
1A related approach has been previously applied by Clark et al. (2005) in the context of estimating
the responses of well-being to income changes.
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Table 5.1: Data Structure
Number of children living Number of parent observations
outside the parental household 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000-2004
One 1,205 1,279 1,313 1,377 1,458 6,632
Two 341 334 363 373 370 1,781
Three 63 51 61 77 74 326
Four 3 3 7 5 4 22
Five 4 4 2 2 2 14
Total 1,616 1,671 1,746 1,834 1,908 8,775
Total number of
parent-child pair observations 2,108 2,132 2,260 2,384 2,446 11,330
5.2 Data Structure and Descriptive Statistics
The analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), an annual survey of
households, which was started in 1984 in West Germany and extended to East Germany
in 1990 (Wagner et al., 1993). As mentioned above, it is an important feature of the
GSOEP that it follows up on adult children who moved out of their parental homes and
may now live in their own families. In more recent waves of the GSOEP, the number of
such children living in spin-off households has become large enough to permit empirical
studies of parent-child pairs.
We analyze data for the years 2000-2004.2 In a first step, we extract 2,577 distinct
parents with at least one traced child living in a spin-off household. Note that, since for
any given parent the number of these children varies between one and five, the number of
observed parent-child pairs is higher than the actual number of parents in the data set.
Table 1 summarizes the data structure for each wave of the panel. For example, among
the 1,616 parents observed in the year 2000 wave, 1,205 parents have only one child living
outside the parental household. The remaining 411 parents have several children, so
that the total number of observed parent-child pairs adds up to 2,108. The panel is not
balanced, as the number of both parents and parent-child pairs varies over time. In total,
the data set contains 8,775 parent observations and 11,330 parent-child pair observations.
Beside a broad range of socio-economic variables, the GSOEP provides information
2The 2004 wave was the latest release when this research was started. Before 2000, the number of
child spin-offs was relatively small, and we therefore took 2000 as our initial year.
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on subjective well-being which can be interpreted as a direct measure of individual utility
and, thus, is of central interest to this paper. All respondents are asked directly about their
general life satisfaction by the following question: “How satisfied are you with your life,
all things considered? Please answer according to the following scale: 0 means completely
dissatisfied, 10 means completely satisfied”. Since general life satisfaction is measured on
an ordinal scale, it needs special consideration in regression models, with parent’s well-
being as dependent variable and children’s well-being as explanatory variable. Section 5.3
discusses these issues in greater detail.
For both parents and children, we extract the following characteristics from the data
set, which are generally thought of as being important determinants of subjective well-
being (see for example Frey and Stutzer (2001)): health, age, employment status, monthly
disposable income, household size, marital status, and mean geographical distance be-
tween the parental household and the spin-off households. Health is measured on a self-
reported five-point scale which is, for simplicity, converted into an indicator variable of
good health status for the highest two values. In contrast to other studies, such as Clark
and Oswald (1994), who find evidence for an U-shaped effect of ageing on reported sub-
jective well-being with a minimum around 35 years, age is included among the other
regressors only in linear form. Since all the parents in the sample are at least 32 years of
age, the effect of ageing is expected to be nearly monotonically and positively associated
with general life satisfaction. We measure the mean distance in kilometers between the
parents’ households and their spin-off households based on the geographical coordinate of
the country’s midpoint, as discussed by Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005). As it is plausi-
ble that parents know less about their children the farther away they live, this provides a
proxy measure for the parent’s general knowledge about their children’s living conditions.
Parents may exhibit paternalistic preferences, that is to say, they do not only care
about their children’s well-being but they may derive direct utility from other attributes
of their children, such as education, marital status, and income, regardless of the effect of
these attributes on their children’s well-being, i.e. for a given level of well-being. If this
is the case, adding the children’s socio-economic characteristics as controls is crucial for
obtaining an unbiased estimator of the prevalence and extent of altruistic preferences.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics
Means (Std.err. in parentheses) Parents Children
Subjective well-beinga 6.573 7.055
(0.019) (0.020)
Good health (yes=1/no=0) 0.311 0.697
(0.005) (0.006)
Age 57.4 30.7
(0.093) (0.075)
Unemployed (yes=1/no=0) 0.085 0.070
(0.003) (0.003)
Monthly income (in EUR) 4,567 4,030
(32.78) (25.97)
Female (yes=1/no=0) 0.542 0.513
(0.005) (0.006)
Years of schooling 11.2 12.3
(0.026) (0.031)
Household size 2.409 2.470
(0.011) (0.015)
Married (yes=1/no=0) 0.822 0.460
(0.004) (0.005)
Transfers paid per year (in EUR) 1,315
(60.14)
Distance between households (in kilometers) 48.2
(1.137)
Person-year Observations 8,775b 6,606c
a Measured on an 0, 1, . . . , 10 scale.
b Excludes multiple person-year observations for parents with several children.
c Excludes multiple person-year observations for children with two parents.
Additionally, the data set contains information on the annual amount of monetary
transfers paid to the children by their parents. This variable is interesting for two reasons:
First, if the parents’ motivation for paying transfers is joy of giving or reciprocity instead
of altruism, we expect parents’ well-being to be positively associated with these transfers
ceteris paribus, i.e. for a given level of the child’s well-being. Thus, we should include it
among the other control variables. Second, after assigning each parent to one of the two
groups, it allows us to compare the average transfer payments of the altruistic parents
with the selfish ones.
Table 2 reveals that children report, on average, a much better health status than
their parents, and the mean difference in age between parents and children is about 27
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years. Due to their lower age, but possibly also because of secular trends in cohabitation,
fewer children than parents are married. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and
we see that the mean differences are statistically significant.
5.3 Model
5.3.1 Basic Model
Our basic modeling framework is an extension of the standard ordered probit model which
allows us to endogenously separate altruistic parents from those who are assumed to be
selfish. Let hit = j, j = 0, 1, . . . , 10, denote the ordered response of parent i at time t on
the 11-point happiness scale. Similarly, vit is the ordered response of parent i’s child at
time t. If there is more than one child, vit is taken to be the response of parent i’s child
at time t.
The main object of interest is P (hit = j|xit), the conditional probability model for the
ordered response of the parents’ happiness, where xit = (xit1, . . . , xitk)′ is a (k× 1) vector
of determinants of subjective well-being, discussed in the previous section, excluding a
constant. If we assume an ordered probit formulation with a linear index function x′itβ =
xit1β1 + . . .+ xitkβk, as in McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), we obtain
P (hit = j|xit) = Φ(κj − x′itβ)− Φ(κj−1 − x′itβ) , (5.1)
where κj > κj−1 are threshold values, and Φ denotes the cumulative density function of
the standard normal distribution.
In order to account for heterogeneity in the parents’ preference types we introduce
an indicator variable, ai, such that ai = 0 if parent i is selfish and does not care for the
well-being of her adult child, and ai = 1 if she is altruistic. For altruistic parents, their
children’s well-being, vit, becomes one of the determinants of their own utility, and we
therefore expect its coefficient, η, to be positive. Whereas for selfish parents, the children’s
well-being has no effect on their own general life satisfaction. This yields the conditional
probability model’s basic form
P (hit = j|xit, vit, ai) = Φ(κj − x′itβ − aiηvit)− Φ(κj−1 − x′itβ − aiηvit) . (5.2)
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In this formulation, the child’s well-being, vit, enters as an explanatory variable. Since
we treat the parents’ happiness hit as an ordinal variable, we should, by symmetry, make
the same assumption on the child’s well-being. It is not immediately obvious how this can
be done in a regression context. Rather than including indicator variables for each possible
response value (in which case we lose the ordering information), we follow Terza (1987)
and replace vit by a cardinalization that is compatible with the ordered probit assumption,
i.e., an underlying normally distributed latent linear index v∗it. The children’s subjective
well-being responses are replaced by their conditional expectations
v˜it = E(v
∗
it|vit = j) = E(v∗it|µ(j−1) ≤ v∗it < µ(j)) =
φ(µ(j−1))− φ(µ(j))
Φ(µ(l))− Φ(µ(j−1)) , (5.3)
where µ(j)s denote the quantiles of the standard normal distribution for the sample cu-
mulative relative frequencies of the eleven response categories j = 0, 1, . . . , 10, and φ
stands for the standard normal density. To test the robustness of our results we modeled
children’s well-being as an indicator, which takes on the value 1 if vit > 4 and zero oth-
erwise, instead of applying Terza’s cardinalization. Besides the obvious loss in efficiency
our estimates remained largely unaffected.
We include the well-being index of the representative (=average) child for parents
with several children in the above expression. Therefore, we implicitly assume that parents
weight their children’s well-being equally.3 To simplify the interpretation of the model, v˜it
is centered around zero which ensures that its effect on the parents’ happiness is captured
solely by η and does not have any influence on the vector of threshold parameters κj.
5.3.2 Extensions
So far the model assumes a pooled data structure and does not take advantage of the fact
that the panel data set contains up to five observations on each parent over time. The
data’s panel structure, however, may help to resolve some of the potential endogeneity
problems.
3Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005) find that their results remain robust when running the analysis on
a subset of parents having a single child. Therefore, the assumption of a representative child seems to be
justified.
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First, if there is unobserved variation in the parents’ permanent consumption lev-
els which is correlated with the children’s consumption due to some unobserved time-
unvarying family-specific effects, αi, the children’s well-being, vi, is endogenous. Second,
imagine a situation where both parents and children share similar attitudes towards their
life satisfaction, like being intrinsically happy or unhappy. Such a correlation, for example
due to genetic transmission, generates an endogeneity problem as well. By ignoring these
potential sources of endogeneity we would attribute the whole correlation between parents’
and their children’s happiness to altruistic preferences even when, say by genetic inheri-
tance, intrinsically content parents may tend to have happier children. Consequently, we
would overestimate the weight of altruistic preferences.
However, the data’s panel structure allows us to isolate that part of the correlation
between parents’ and their children’s happiness which is caused by altruistic preferences,
as long as the unobserved other causes, i.e. the family-specific effects αi, remain constant
over time. In a linear regression model we would eliminate αi and obtain a fixed-effects
estimator by either taking first differences or applying the within-transformation. Unfor-
tunately, due the ordered probit’s nonlinear form neither is possible. A dummy variable
approach is ruled out as well, since it consumes too many degrees of freedom and leads
to an incidental parameters problem with inconsistent maximum likelihood estimators.
To be able to address time-unvarying unobservable effects in probit formulations all
the same, Mundlak (1978) proposed to model the correlation between the unobserved
time-constant effects and the regressors directly. In our case, by assuming that the family-
specific effects, αi, are normally distributed conditional on the individual means, x¯ and
¯˜v, such that
αi|x¯i, ¯˜vi ∼ N(x¯′iδ1 + δ2 ¯˜vi,σ2α) , (5.4)
their long-run correlation with the dependent variable, hit, can be segregated from the
effect of altruistic preferences. As the sum of two normal distributions is again normally
distributed, we obtain the following conditional probability model which accounts for
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family-specific effects:
P (hit = j|xi, vi, ai) = (5.5)
Φ(κj − x′itβ − aiηv˜it − x¯′iδ1 − δ2 ¯˜vi)− Φ(κj−1 − x′itβ − aiηv˜it − x¯′iδ1 − δ2 ¯˜vi) ,
where η measures the causal effect of the children’s on their parents’ happiness. Note
that all parameters are now scaled by an unidentified but constant factor (1 + σ2α)
−1/2.
This scaling can be safely ignored, as it cancels out, as long as we base our inference on
standard errors obtained by the bootstrap method, and interpret the parameter estimates
either in terms of marginal probability effects or relative sizes.
5.3.3 Estimation of the Model
In order to estimate the model we have to deal with the fact that we cannot directly
observe a given parent’s preference type, i.e. a priori we do not know whether she is
selfish or altruistic. In the following, we discuss our estimation strategy which allows us
to overcome this kind of incomplete-data problem. We also briefly address some issues
which typically arise during the maximum likelihood estimation of a finite mixture model.
The conditional probability model directly translates into the parent’s type-specific
density, which can be written as
f(hi|xi, vi, ai) =
Ti∏
t=1
f(hit|xi, vi, ai) . (5.6)
As we do not observe the indicator ai directly, parent i’s preference type is unknown a
priori. Therefore, we have to weight her type-specific density by the probability that she
belongs to the corresponding type, which equals this type’s relative size. This yields the
model’s log likelihood function
lnL(Ψ;x, v) =
N∑
i=1
ln [piaf(hi|xi, vi, ai = 1) + (1− pia) f(hi|xi, vi, ai = 0)] , (5.7)
where pia is the share of altruists in the population and Ψ = (β′, δ′,κ′, η,pia)′ denotes a
vector containing all the unknown parameters of the model which need to be estimated.
As in any finite mixture model (for a general treatise see McLachlan and Peel (2000)), the
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relative size of the altruists’s group, pia, cannot be estimated separately from the remain-
ing parameters of the conditional probability model. It is well known that this highly
nonlinearform and the potential multimodality, the existence of several local maxima, of
the log likelihood function affect the speed of the optimization algorithm negatively, or
even prohibit locating the global maximum.
However, if individual group membership ai were observed, Dempster et al. (1977)
show that the so-called complete data log likelihood function would take on the much
simpler form
ln L˜(Ψ;x, v, a) = (5.8)
N∑
i=1
ai [ln pia + ln f(hi|xi, vi, ai = 1)] + (1− ai) [ln (1− pia) + ln f(hi|xi, vi, ai = 0)] .
In this case, the estimated share of altruists, pˆia = 1/N
∑N
i=1 ai, would be given analytically
and the maximum likelihood estimates of the remaining parameters could be obtained
separately by numerically maximizing the corresponding type-specific densities.
Dempster and Laird’s Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm now proceeds iter-
atively in two steps, E and M. During the E-step, given the actual fit of the data, an a
posteriori probability of being an altruist is obtained for each parent according to Bayes’
Law by
τa,i =
piaf(hi|xi, vi, ai = 1)
piaf(hi|xi, vi, ai = 1) + (1− pia) f(hi|xi, vi, ai = 0) . (5.9)
In the M-step, the complete data log likelihood is maximized, where the unobserved
indicator ai is replaced by these a posteriori probabilities of belonging to the altruistic
group. Note that, beside being able to deal with the nonlinearity of the log likelihood
function, the EM-Algorithm also allows us, based on these τa,i, to endogenously classify
each parent as being either altruistic or selfish.
The problems caused by multimodality can be addressed by implementing a stochastic
version of the EM algorithm, such as the Simulated Annealing Expectation Maximization
(SAEM) algorithm developed by Celeux et al. (1996). In each iteration, it has a positive
probability of leaving a once taken path to convergence and starting over in a different
region of the log likelihood function. This results in much higher chances of converging
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to the global maximum but comes at the cost of even higher computational demands
than the standard EM algorithm. The estimation routine, which we programmed in the
R environment (R Development Core Team, 2006), therefore uses a hybrid form (Render
and Walker, 1984) of the SAEM algorithm, which is more reliable in the detection of the
global maximum, and the much faster BFGS algorithm.4
The lowest five categories of parents’ subjective well-being responses are only sparsely
populated, with 11.4 percent of all responses overall. For practical reasons, we collapsed
those five responses into a single category, ensuring that during the bootstrap estimation
of the standard errors, all response categories contain at least one observation in each sub-
sample, a requirement for estimation of the full model, with a sufficiently high probability.
Moreover, in a single index model such as ours, combining categories does not affect the
estimator’s consistency. The only costs are some loss in efficiency and the impossibility
of predicting conditional outcome probabilities for the single components (which is not
essential for our research question). As several randomly generated start values all led to
the same maximum likelihood estimates the model seems to be well identified.
5.4 Results
In this section, we present the results of total four finite mixture regressions. The first
part deals with model selection issues and therefore addresses the question of whether we
need to control for family-specific effects and alternative motivations for paying transfers,
such as paternalistic preferences, joy of giving, and reciprocity. The second part sheds
light on our main research question by discussing the prevalence and extent of altruistic
preferences. Finally, we investigate whether parents who get assigned to the group of
altruists actually pay higher average transfers to their children.
4The Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm is a Quasi-Newton method which allows
solving unconstrained non-linear optimization problems (see for example Broyden (1970)). It is one of the
standard hill-climbing optimization routines implemented in the R environment as well as other statistical
packages such as STATA.
121
5.4.1 Model Selection
Table 3 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of four different finite mixture ordered
probit models, which all discriminate between selfish and altruistic parents by analyzing
the direct dependence of parental utility on children’s well-being. The standard errors, in
parentheses, are based on the bootstrap method and clustered by individuals to control for
possible serial correlation. Not shown in the Table are coefficients on four time dummies
in each model that capture a potential time trend in happiness as well as the Mundlak
parameter estimates δˆ1 and δˆ2 in the family-effects models.
Model 1 represents the baseline as it only uses the parents’ socio-economic character-
istics as controls and makes no use of the data’s panel structure. While still assuming the
data to be pooled over time, Model 2 includes the children’s socio-economic characteristics
as well. Thus, it takes into account that parents may not only care about their children’s
happiness but obtain utility directly from their offsprings’s socio-economic status, too. In
such a case, we should control for these paternalistic preferences and prefer Model 2 over
Model 1 in order to avoid omitted variable bias. As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, there may
exist unobserved family-specific effects which result in an endogeneity problem and lead
to biased estimators as well. In contrast to their pooled counterparts, 1 and 2, the mod-
els 3 and 4 use the data’s panel structure to control for such time-unvarying unobserved
effects by applying Mundlak’s formulation. They therefore take the potential correlation
between the regressors and these effects into account. Consequently, they consistently
identify parents with altruistic preferences even when correlated family-specific effects are
present. Since the family-effects models include the individual means over time of all
regressors, x¯ and ¯˜v, we have to exclude the variables age, years of schooling, and gender
(but not their means over time) in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity. The number of
parameters therefore rises by 8 if we go from Model 1 to Model 3, and by 13 from Model
2 to Model 4 respectively.
A further potential source of bias, not explicitly considered so far, can arise due to
simultaneity, if children’s utility depends on their parents’ utility as well. To consider
the empirical relevance of such a possibility, we performed a Rivers-Vuong-Test (Rivers
and Vuong, 1988) in a pooled standard ordered probit model with the children’s age and
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Table 5.3: Finite Mixture Estimates of Parental Well-being. (N = 8, 775 observations)
Pooled over time Family Effects
Coefficients and (Std.err.a) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fraction of altruists pˆia 0.277 0.274 0.210 0.214
(0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Children’s well-being in the group 0.865∗∗ 0.873∗∗ 0.918∗∗ 0.912∗∗
of altruists ηˆ (0.064) (0.068) (0.094) (0.083)
Good health 0.762∗∗ 0.760∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 0.300∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
Log-Income 0.480∗∗ 0.471∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.140∗
(0.039) (0.046) (0.057) (0.056)
Unemployed -0.384∗∗ -0.382∗∗ -0.222∗∗ -0.224∗∗
(0.065) (0.059) (0.062) (0.061)
Married 0.050 0.037 0.244 0.247
(0.060) (0.059) (0.139) (0.143)
Log-Household size -0.223∗∗ -0.206∗∗ 0.177 0.185
(0.063) (0.066) (0.091) (0.095)
Distance between households -0.054∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.003 -0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.031) (0.035)
Transfers paid (in 1,000 EUR) 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ageb 0.185 0.147∗∗
(0.023) (0.036)
Good health of the average child 0.009 -0.041
(0.038) (0.032)
Log-Income of the average child -0.049 0.032
(0.041) (0.045)
Unemployment of the average child 0.013 0.054
(0.059) (0.053)
Average child is married 0.036 -0.012
(0.053) (0.055)
Log-Household size of the average child 0.016 0.009
(0.056) (0.064)
Age of the average childb 0.068
(0.055)
Years of schooling of the average childc 0.018
(0.010)
Average Child is femalec 0.019
(0.042)
Log-Likelihood -14,442.63 -14,434.04 -14,299.88 -14,288.39
BIC 29,067 29,122 28,854 28,949
a All standard errors are clustered and obtained on the basis of 300 bootstrap replications.
b Only individual means over time are included in models 3 & 4 due to perfect time-dependence.
c Only individual means over time are included in model 4 due to time-invariance.
All models additionally contain six threshold parameters and four time dummies.
Models 3 & 4 contain additional parameters for the individual means over time.
Significance codes: ∗∗significant at α = 1%; ∗significant at α = 5%
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gender as instruments. The fact that the estimated residuals from the first-stage linear
regression of the test were not significant in the ordered probit estimation of the second
stage (p-value=0.37), means that the absence of simultaneity bias could not be rejected.
Looking at the estimated parameters in Table 3, we find the results of all four models
to be in line with prior findings in the happiness literature. Health and income both
show a significant positive effect on parent’s subjective well-being, whereas the impact of
unemployment is highly significantly negative. As expected, the effect of good health is
very large in relative size.5 With the exception of log-household size, which is insignificant
in the family-effects model, all coefficients preserve the same sign. Furthermore, as the
parameter estimates in the family effects models only rely on variation within the indi-
viduals over time, it comes at no surprise that their standard errors are generally larger
than these estimated from the pooled models.
While our main interest is in patterns regarding altruism, to be discussed in detail
below, the regressions also provide some evidence for the presence of paternalistic prefer-
ences, joy of giving, and reciprocity. A test for the presence of paternalistic preferences
comes down to the question whether the coefficients of the children’s socio-economic char-
acteristics are jointly significant. Two likelihood ratio tests (model 2 against model 1, and
model 4 against model 3) show that the null-hypothesis of the absence of paternalistic
preferences has to be rejected (the p-values are 0.028 and 0.042, respectively). Thus we
conclude that parents care directly for their children’s socio-economic standing, which
rules out models 1 and 3. Since the remaining two models, 2 and 4, are not nested, they
cannot be tested against each other. A comparison based on the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) reveals a slight advantage for the family effects model.
With regards to joy of giving, a necessary condition for such an effect is that transfers
increase a parent’s happiness ceteris paribus, i.e. for a given happiness of the child. This
condition is not sufficient, though, as there may be other explanations why transfers can
be associated with increased happiness. One is that parents in a better financial situation
give more to their children, and they may be happier for that very reason, i.e., the better
financial situation, rather than the transfers per se. Therefore, it is important to eliminate
5The absolute size of the coefficients in the family-effects model cannot be compared directly to their
pooled models’ correspondents, as they are scaled by an unidentified, but constant factor (1 + σ2α)1/2.
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this potential confounding effect by controlling for parental income. Second, the observed
transfers could be a ”pay-back” for received, or anticipated future services that children
provide for their parents. We do not observe such services in the data. Hence, we cannot
exclude that part of the transfer effect is due to reciprocity rather than joy of giving
proper. From model 4 with family effects (p-value=0.028) or model 2 for the pooled panel
(p-value=0.015), there is evidence that transfers have a statistically significant positive
effect on well-being, after controlling for income as well as the child’s utility. Thus, joy of
giving and/or reciprocity appear to be motives for transfers as well.
5.4.2 Prevalence and Extent of Altruistic Preferences
The main parameters of interest, pˆia, the estimated fraction of altruists, and ηˆ, the extent
of interdependence in the altruists’ preferences, are highly significant with p-values close
to zero in all models. The estimated fraction of altruists is larger (27.4%) in the pooled
model than in the model which accounts for family-effects (21.4%), although the difference
is not statistically significant. All in all, the estimated share of altruists is comparable
in magnitude to the 20% reported by Phelps (2001) who relies on psychological tests in
a U.S. survey. So, even if we apply a completely different methodology and examine
members of the same family instead of strangers, we obtain results that are qualitatively
similar to those of Phelps’. Furthermore, our estimates for the spread of altruism are
also similar to the fraction of people who treat their own and others’ payoffs as perfect
substitutes in dictator games (Andreoni and Miller, 2002). This indicates that, after
controlling for children’s socio-economic characteristics and parents’ income as well as
applying a family-effects estimator, survey based estimates can provide some meaningful
information on preference interdependence and altruism.
As in any other standard ordered probit model, only the signs of the coefficients within
a certain group of the finite mixture ordered probit model have a direct interpretation
(Boes and Winkelmann, 2006). Arguably, the most intuitive way of interpreting the
quantitative effect of the representative child’s well-being in the group of altruistic parents
is to compute its average marginal probability effect (AMPE) of observing a certain
parental response with regard to well-being. To compute the AMPE, each parent has to
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Table 5.4: Average Marginal Probability Effect of v˜it
Response Model 2 Model 4
category Estimates (Std.err.a) Estimates (Std.err.a)
Zero to four -0.155 (0.015) -0.163 (0.017)
Five -0.052 (0.007) -0.045 (0.009)
Six -0.017 (0.005) -0.012 (0.006)
Seven 0.009 (0.006) 0.011 (0.008)
Eight 0.087 (0.008) 0.078 (0.012)
Nine 0.060 (0.005) 0.055 (0.005)
Ten 0.069 (0.011) 0.075 (0.013)
a All standard errors are clustered and obtained on the basis of 300 bootstrap
replications.
be classified either as being altruistic or selfish. This is achieved by assigning each parent
to the altruists whose a posteriori probability, τa,i, is greater than 50%. By definition
marginal probability effects are zero in the group of selfish parents.
Table 4 shows the AMPE of the child’s well-being in the group of altruistic parents.6
For example, a permanent unit increase in v˜it (i.e. a one standard deviation increase)
would, ceteris paribus, boost the probability of observing the most frequent subjective
well-being response, h = 8, by 8.7 percentage points in model 2 and 7.8 percentage points
in model 4.
5.4.3 Transfer Payments by Preference Type
If the model correctly identifies the parents with altruistic preferences, we expect them
to be on average more likely to make transfers to their children. Even though, as argued
before, not all the parents in the altruistic group necessarily need to pay actual transfers.
As we have both the transfer payments and the individual probabilities of being an altruist
we can run a regression to check and quantify this association.
Table 5 shows the results of two OLS regressions of the annual transfer amount, paid by
the parents to their representative child, on the a posteriori probabilities τa,i from models
2 and 4. These regressions control for various socio-economic characteristics of the parents
6By definition, the AMPEs have to sum up to zero in both models. The small differences (0.001) from
zero in the results reported in table 4 are due to rounding error.
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Table 5.5: Regressions of Transfer Amount (N = 8, 775 observations)
OLS regression of
transfers (in 1,000 EUR)
Coefficients and (Std.err.a) Model 2b Model 4b
A posteriori probability 0.905∗ 1.000∗
of being an altruists τa,i (0.400) (0.490)
Good health -0.128 -0.122
(0.135) (0.132)
Log-Income 1.616∗∗ 1.619∗∗
(0.178) (0.219)
Unemployed -0.056 -0.053
(0.139) (0.143)
Married 0690∗∗ 0.686∗∗
(0.166) (0.160)
Log-Household size -1.634∗∗ -1.636∗∗
(0.213) (0.228)
Years of schooling 0.251∗∗ 0.251∗∗
(0.038) (0.043)
Good health of the average child -0.128 -0.124
(0.176) (0.180)
Log-Income of the average child -0.509∗∗ -0.509∗∗
(0.178) (0.179)
Unemployment of the average child 0.480 0.481
(0.532) (0.533)
Average child is married 0.690 0.221
(0.190) (0.195)
Log-Household size of the average child 0.087 0.085
(0.170) (0.180)
Years of schooling of the average child 0.047 0.047
(0.037) (0.037)
Intercept -10.901∗∗ -10.883∗∗
(1.933) (1.780)
R2 0.049 0.049
a All standard errors are clustered and obtained on the basis of 300 bootstrap replications.
Significance codes: ∗∗significant at α = 1%; ∗significant at α = 5%
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and their children. As expected, parents’ income shows a significant positive sign, whereas
the average child’s income is negatively correlated with transfers paid by the parents.
Parental household size also shows the expected negative sign, and parents with higher
education seem to be more willing to pay transfers to their children. Most interestingly,
the results show a significant positive relationship between transfer payments and the
individual a posteriori probabilities of having altruistic preferences.7 In both models, the
estimated transfer amount is roughly 1, 000 Euros higher for altruistic parents than it is
for the rest of the population. The fact that parents to whom the model assigns a high
probability of having altruistic preferences indeed pay, on average, much higher transfers
to their children, gives us a strong indication that the econometric model is capable of
identifying the altruists in the data set.
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the share of parents with altruistic preferences in a data set
stemming from a representative annual survey, the GSOEP. The panel structure of the
data allows us to control for various sources of bias, such as paternalistic preferences,
genetically transmitted inclinations towards general life satisfaction or any other sort
of time-invariant family-specific effects. The estimated share of altruists lies between
21% to 27% of the population, depending on whether the model accounts for family-
specific effects or not. When we control for family-specific effects the estimated fraction
of altruists, which lies around one fifth, coincides roughly with the findings of two recent
studies relying on different, psychological (Phelps, 2001) as well as experimental (Andreoni
and Miller, 2002), methodologies and data sets.
The estimated size of the effect of the children’s reported life satisfaction on their
altruistic parents’ subjective well-being is both robust and relatively large in terms of
marginal probability effects. Besides altruism, we find evidence that joy of giving and/or
reciprocity provide an additional motivation for parents to pay transfers to their children.
Furthermore, we have shown that actual transfers to the children are on average con-
7If we exclude transfers in model 2 and 4, the classification and, consequently, the results remain
stable. Therefore, the dependence of τa,i on transfers paid seems negligible.
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siderably larger for parents who get, with a high probability, assigned to the altruistic
group. This provides strong evidence that the econometric model, on average, correctly
identifies the parents with altruistic preferences as these individuals show a consistent
behavior in their transfer payments. Our approach, which is based on a finite mixture
model to account for heterogeneity in preference types and relies on subjective well-being
as immediate proxy for utility, seems therefore to be well suited to estimate the share of
altruists in panel surveys such as the GSOEP.
Finally, the finding that some parents’ subjective well-being positively depends on
the happiness of their children living in spin-off households confirms the results of other
studies that altruistic preferences are present in at least a minority of the population.
While this study focuses on altruism, further research has to show whether other cleanly
segregated social preference types exist and how they relate to existing theories of other-
regarding preferences. Such a deeper understanding of the heterogeneity in preferences
may be crucial in determining equilibria, especially when markets are imperfect. So far,
we conclude that altruistic preferences are substantial in their prevalence as well as their
extent, and they are likely to play an important role in public economics.
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